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Unprecedented levels of migration occur due to ever-increasing globalization. Because of this, 
countries that once promoted welcoming immigration policies now face immense challenges to 
reform their immigration laws. Some of these attempts, however, appear to actively target and 
discriminate against ethnic minorities whilst undermining central political authority and 
jurisdiction over immigration policy. To better understand the issue of controversial immigration 
policies within the Western World, this paper will place two case studies into their proper legal 
context. The goal of this paper is to address the issue of why centralized authority is being 
undermined by member-states, and how illegality, with reference to immigration policy, occurs 
and is allowed to continue. 
The two case studies, Arizona’s SB1070 and France’s Repatriation Policy of 2010, are 
analyzed because in both political systems, the US federal system and the EU’s more loosely 
organized political entity, these two member-states circumvented central authority to address the 
issue of illegal immigration. With an examination of each political entity’s laws, legal precedent, 
the controversial policies and arguments relating to the policies, this paper will establish the 
credibility or illegality of each state-level immigration policy. Only through a comprehensive 
legal interpretation of immigration policy and human rights law will we better understand the 
issue’s controversial nature. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
As globalization causes unprecedented levels of migration, countries that promoted welcoming 
immigration policies now face immense challenges to reform their immigration laws. In order to 
place the issue of new immigration policies into proper legal context, the two case-studies – the 
state of Arizona versus the United States’ (US) federal government, the French government 
versus the European Union (EU) – will be compared to best address the issue of how and why 
centralized authority is being undermined by member-states, and how illegality, with reference to 
unconstitutional immigration policy, occurs and is allowed to continue. 
In both political systems, member-states circumvented central authority to address the 
issue of immigration. Arizona, in 2010, passed SB1070, a stringent law rewriting how 
immigration law enforcement is addressed. This new state law demanded immigrants always 
possess their alien registration documents and for police to seek reasons to suspect immigrants 
are in the United States illegally1. 
                                                 
1 CNN, April 23, 2010 “What does Arizona’s immigration law do?” February 7, 2011. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-23/politics/immigration.faq_1_arizona-immigration-law-reform-
sb1070?_s=PM:POLITICS  
This law demands immigrants to “carry their alien registration documents at all times and requires police 
to [seek out any] reason to suspect the [immigrants are] in the United States illegally”. 
 2 
Similarly in 2010, the French government initiated a program to deport immigrants 
incapable of finding employment after a 3-month minimum residency2. This action, initially 
thought uncontroversial and abiding EU law, quickly exploded as French government circulars 
indicated that the closing of 300 immigrant camps and expulsion of 1,000 individuals targeted 
one group: ROMA3. The French government’s action was deemed a breach of the EU’s ban on 
ethnic discrimination, resulting in the European Commission’s desire to launch infringement 
proceedings4. Despite the issue’s extensive debate, the controversial French policy continues to 
remain in effect. 
This paper will place SB1070 and the French repatriation policy within their proper legal 
and political context so as to better understand how and why illegal, unconstitutional 
immigration laws are undermining centralized authority.  By using EU and US founding treaties, 
legal precedent, legal opinions and arguments to determine the laws’ legitimacy and legality, this 
paper will devise the legality of each actor’s policy. 
In order to accomplish this objective, this paper will be written into three chapters. The 
first two chapters will focus on different case studies, the first chapter involving the American 
case study of Arizona’s SB1070; the second, France’s deportation policy and the EU. These first 
two chapters will introduce their respective situations, describe the specific legislation or 
government action, and analyze the laws within the legal framework of their greater political 
organization. The third chapter will comprise a comparative analysis between the American and 
European case studies and devise a policy goal for both systems to address these continuing 
                                                 
2 BBC. "BBC News - France Sends Roma Gypsies Back to Romania." Bbc.co.uk. BBC - Homepage, 20 
Aug. 2010. Web. 19 Feb. 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11020429  
3 Traynor, Ian. "Roma Deportations by France a Disgrace, Says EU | World News | The 
Guardian." Guardian.co.uk. The Guardian, 14 Sept. 2010. Web. 19 Feb. 2012. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/14/roma-deportations-france-eu-disgrace  
4 Ibid 3 
 3 
controversial situations. In both systems, political actors are targeting a specific minority, 
Hispanics or ROMA. Both ethnicities represent easy political targets, incapable of responding at 
the higher level of political organization or raising enough votes to raise adequate awareness to 
the situation. Because of this, an examination of each country’s immigration law and policy must 
be conducted with regards to human rights law to ensure these ethnic minorities are not being 
actively, and disproportionately, discriminated against. Only through a comprehensive legal 
interpretation of immigration policy will there be a better understanding of these issues’ 
controversial nature. 
 4 
2.0  FIRST CHAPTER – CASE STUDY: ARIZONA V UNITED STATES 
2.1 FIRST SECTION: BACKGROUND OF SB1070 – ESTABLISHING AZ MOTIVE  
Throughout US history, immigration remains a controversial political issue. Today, some 
Americans, concerned with the lack of employment opportunities, want the federal government 
to place stricter regulations upon illegal immigrants. Seizing upon the federal government’s 
inability to stop illegal immigration, political actors, such as Arizona’s Republican-led state 
legislature and Governor Jan Brewer, took the matter of addressing immigration reform into their 
hands. 
Prior to SB1070, the state of Arizona previously dealt with immigration reform. In 
attempts to pass similar stringent immigration legislation in 2006 and 2008, Arizona’s 
Republican-led state legislature was twice defeated by vetoes from then Democratic Governor 
Janet Napolitano5. To work around the political stalemate of the gubernatorial veto power and 
enact immigration control, the state congress passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), 
also referred to as the “Employer Sanction Law”, in 2007. This law prohibited any business 
                                                 
5 Archibold, Randal, NY Times. “Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration” April 23, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?ref=us  
“Among other things, the Arizona measure is an extraordinary rebuke to former Gov. Janet Napolitano, 
who had vetoed similar legislation repeatedly as a Democratic governor of the state before being 
appointed Homeland Security secretary by Mr. Obama.” 
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within the state to hire illegal residents willingly and knowingly67. Before 2010, this law, 
deemed, “The most comprehensive and restrictive of such efforts to pass effective legislation,” 
quickly became controversial and attracted legal suits against it8. Despite legal action taken by 
the Obama Administration, US Chamber of Commerce and several civil rights groups claiming 
the law to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) upheld the Arizona law9. Though 
                                                 
6 Horne, AZ Attorney General Tom. “Legal Arizona Workers Act,” 2012. https://www.azag.gov/legal-az-
workers-act   
“The Legal Arizona Workers Act, as amended, prohibits businesses from knowingly or intentionally 
hiring an “unauthorized alien” after December 31, 2007. Under the statute, an “unauthorized alien” is 
defined as “an alien who does not have the legal right or authorization under federal law to work in the 
US.” The law also requires employers in Arizona to use the “E-Verify” system (a free Web-based service 
offered by the federal Department of Homeland Security) to verify the employment authorization of all 
new employees hired after December 31, 2007.” 
7 Perkins Coie, Legal Consultants. “Governor Signs Legal Arizona Workers Act” July 9, 2007. 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/governor-signs-legal-arizona-workers-act-07-09-2007/  
“Employers are prohibited from intentionally or knowingly employing an ‘unauthorized alien,’ the Act’s 
term for an individual who lacks the right or authorization under federal law to work in the US. The 
definition of ‘intentionally’ is taken from Arizona’s criminal code, meaning that the employer’s objective 
is to engage in the conduct or cause the result proscribed by the law – here, employing unauthorized 
aliens. ‘Knowingly’ is defined consistently with federal law regarding unlawful employment of aliens and 
includes hiring someone for employment without complying with federal requirements for verifying 
employment authorization (the I-9 form).” 
8 Lofstrum, M.; Bohn, S.; Raphael, S. PPIC, “Lessons from the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act” March 
2011. http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_311MLR.pdf  
“Federal legislators have been unable to pass comprehensive immigration reform, resulting in… several 
states… enacting their own. The most comprehensive and restrictive… so far is Arizona’s 2007 Legal 
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA). It attempts to reduce the reliance on unauthorized workers by mandating 
the use of a national identity and work authorization verification system called E-Verify, and by imposing 
sanctions on employers who continue to hire such workers. A recent PPIC report supports the contention 
that current federal employer sanctions, which do not mandate the use of the E-verify system, have been 
ineffective.” 
9 Savage, David. LA Times, “Supreme Court upholds Arizona immigration law targeting employers” May 
26, 2011.  http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/26/nation/la-na-court-immigration-ruling-20110526  
“The Supreme Court gave a…boost to proponents of stricter state laws against illegal immigration by 
upholding Arizona's "business death penalty" for employers who repeatedly hire undocumented workers. 
The 5-3 ruling gives more states a green light to target those who employ illegal immigrants. And because 
it rejected the contention that the state was interfering with the federal government's authority over 
immigration, the decision also encouraged supporters of Arizona's even more controversial immigration 
law…The ruling said Arizona could deny employers a business license after a second violation of its 
Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007. Also upheld was Arizona's requirement that employers check with 
the federal E-Verify program before hiring workers. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. said Arizona's 
licensing law "falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the states," 
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retaining its controversial nature, the 2007 legislation was deemed successful by the state of 
Arizona as the, “mandating E-Verify in Arizona achieved the intended goal of reducing the 
number of unauthorized immigrants in the state”10. 
With a judicial victory establishing LAWA as within the state’s authority and not 
violating federal supremacy, in addition to evidence proving a diminishment of the Hispanic 
population, not necessarily the unauthorized worker population, in Arizona, the state government 
viewed it possessed the legitimacy to introduce further immigration policy reform. In order to 
better address the issue of illegal immigration, without facing the threat of gubernatorial veto, as 
the former Democratic Governor was chosen as President Obama’s Secretary of Homeland 
Security in 2008, Arizona’s Republican state government passed SB1070 on 23 April 2010, 
(originally entitled the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act) a bill that 
demands all immigrants carry their identification papers while granting police the power to ask 
anyone they suspect of being an illegal immigrant to show their legal status papers11. Arizona 
                                                                                                                                                             
rebuffing challenges from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Obama administration and civil rights 
groups.” 
10 Ibid 8 
“Our research indicates that mandating E-Verify in Arizona achieved the intended goal of reducing the 
number of unauthorized immigrants in the state. However, it also had the unintended consequence of 
shifting unauthorized workers into less formal work arrangements. Specifically, we find that the 
population of non-citizen Hispanic immigrants—a high proportion of whom are unauthorized 
immigrants—in Arizona fell by roughly 92,000 persons, or approximately 17 percent, because of LAWA 
over 2008–2009. This decline is greater than those observed in comparison states, and was not caused by 
the recent recession. Regarding the employment outcomes of the unauthorized, LAWA reduced 
employment opportunities in the wage and salary sector for unauthorized immigrants, with many of these 
workers shifting into self-employment. Our estimates suggest that wage and salary employment of 
Hispanic non-citizens dropped by approximately 56,000 while non-citizen Hispanic self-employment 
increased by about 25,000…We found no strong evidence that LAWA, as of yet, either harms or benefits 
competing authorized workers.” 
11 Ibid 5  
 7 
passed this law almost along party lines, with no Democratic support and one Republican state 
senator voting against it1213. 
SB1070, passed with Governor Brewer’s approval, was organized in order for Arizona to 
address the ineptitude of the Federal government regarding immigration policy. The last major 
change in federal governmental immigration policy dates back to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952; since 1965 it has only been amended, never officially replaced by 
updated, contemporary congressional initiatives14. For decades, immigration reform remained on 
the docket, always failing to pass in Washington. In recent history, attempts at revising current 
immigration policy failed in Congress, both in 2006 and 200715. Both measures attempted to 
strengthen border security and establish the DREAM Act, a policy granting legal status and a 
path to citizenship for illegal immigrants and their children who already reside and work in the 
US16. Both bipartisan legislative bills, however, failed to either reach consensus between the 
congressional houses, or a vote. Because of the continued inability of Congress to pass 
                                                 
12 Rossi, Donna. KPHO.com, “Immigration Bill Takes Huge Step Forward” 13 April 2010 
http://www.kpho.com/story/14782265/immigration-bill-takes-huge-step-forward-4-13-2010  
“House Republicans advanced the measure on a 35-21 party-line vote. The Senate approved the bill in 
February but has to agree to changes made in the House before sending it to Gov. Jan Brewer.” 
13 Arizona State Legislature, “BILL STATUS VOTES FOR SB1070 - Final Reading” 2010 
http://www.azleg.gov//FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070.sfinal.1.asp&Session_
ID=93  
14 US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). “Immigration and Nationality Act” 6 June 2011. 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=f
3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD  
“The Immigration and Nationality Act, or INA, was created in 1952… The McCarran-Walter bill of 1952, 
Public Law No. 82-414, collected and codified many existing provisions and reorganized the structure of 
immigration law. The Act has been amended many times over the years, bit is still the basic body of 
immigration law.” 
15 Kondracke, Mort. RearClearPolitics.com, “Immigration Failure Gives Senate Profile in Political 
Cowardice” 2 July 2007 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/immigration_failure_profile_in.html  
16 Ibid 15 
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substantial and modern immigration reform, many states, such as Arizona, believed something 
needed to be done. 
Instead of awaiting federal, centralized authority, action, the state of Arizona, according 
to Governor Jan Brewer, exercised its right to address the terribly disruptive influences of illegal 
immigration and crime facing the state17. SB1070 establishes itself in that it rewrites the way in 
which immigration laws and their enforcement are addressed. Applicable to everyone in Arizona, 
police can ask anyone they suspect of being an immigrant, whether they are illegal aliens, 
naturalized citizens or citizens by birth, for their legal documents18. 
The passing of this state legislation led to significant action taken by the federal 
government and numerous external actors, such as fellow state governments, human rights 
groups and international governments denouncing the law. Additionally, judicial injunctions 
were placed upon Sections 2(b), 3, 5(c) and 6 of SB1070 by a federal district court prior to the 
bill entering into effect. In order to address all components of the controversial SB1070 through 
a legal lens, this paper will examine the Constitution in order to establish which branch of 
government retains jurisdiction over immigration law. This is important for if immigration 
reform is classified as an enumerated power, a power granted to the federal government, the state 
of Arizona would have acted illegally and the law should not stand. If immigration policy’s 
jurisdiction is not specified and is instead interpreted, by the federal government, as a centralized 
policy due to the Supremacy clause, this paper will then examine SCOTUS legal precedent so as 
                                                 
17 Brewer, Governor Janice. “Statement by Governor Jan Brewer” April 23, 2010. 
http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf   
“We in Arizona have been more than patient waiting for Washington to act. But decades of federal 
inaction and misguided policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation…Border-related 
violence and crime due to illegal immigration are critically important issues to the people of our state, to 
my Administration and to me, as your Governor and as a citizen.” 
18 This law demands immigrants to “carry their alien registration documents at all times and requires 
police to [seek out any] reason to suspect the [immigrants are] in the US illegally” (CNN, 2010). 
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to better understand which body of government traditionally and legally possesses jurisdiction 
and supremacy. This section is key to understanding the American federal system and placing 
the debate circulating SB1070 into proper context. 
The proceeding section will examine with the language of the law and the legal 
ramifications dealt upon SB1070. In addition, this section will utilize language from proponents 
for and against the law to better analyze SB1070. Furthermore, this section will address why 
Arizona chose to pass such a law in 2010, and what reasons – political, economic or other – 
prompted such a bill. Through legal analysis, this paper will discern that the Arizona state 
legislature enacted a policy that violated the supremacy of the American Constitution, 
circumventing the federal government’s jurisdiction over immigration policy. 
2.2 SECOND SECTION: IMMIGRATION POLICY LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The US Constitution does not express with clear and active intent which level or department of 
government retains jurisdiction over immigration policy. The seven articles of the Constitution deal 
with the delineation of powers for the legislature, executive and judicial branches along with other 
measures to establish and authorize legal government; within these articles, only one section remotely 
references immigration: Article 1, Section 819. This section of Article 1, referred to as the 
Naturalization Clause, stresses Congress’ jurisdiction over, and ability to grant, naturalization, giving 
Congress the ability to establish citizenship20. Though only a small provision compared to the current 
                                                 
19 Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties 
and Justice. 6th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2007. Print. p792 
“The Congress shall have power to… establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” 
20 Ibid 19 
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extent of immigration law, this clause, along with the Supremacy clause, establishes the basis for the 
clear delineation and jurisdiction of immigration policy: the ‘Plenary Power’ Doctrine, the executive 
and legislative branches’ ability to regulate immigration without judicial intervention21. 
The Plenary Power Doctrine, a judicial orchestration of federal power, developed because the 
Constitution did not specify the jurisdiction of immigration policy to a branch of government, except 
the aforementioned power of ‘naturalization’ to Congress22. In order to address the lack of political 
and judicial authority over immigration, the federal government’s executive and legislative branches 
developed the nation’s immigration policy. SCOTUS, in its establishment of the Plenary Power 
Doctrine, did not seek judicial authority over immigration policy because it recognized that decisions 
regarding immigration better fit the powers and responsibilities of elected officials, of the federal 
executive and legislative branches, than those of appointed judges, persons not held accountable by the 
electorate, for six reasons: the Political Question Doctrine, Lack of Capacity, Uniformity, Efficiency, 
Immigration Enforcement not being a Punishment, and History (Stare Decisis)23. These reasons, 
                                                 
21 Feere, Jon. “Plenary Power: Should Judges Control US Immigration Policy?” Center for Immigration 
Studies. February 2009. text p.1 
22 Ibid 21 
23 Ibid 21, p1-2 
“Political Question Doctrine: Federal Courts…refuse to hear cases that involve policy questions best 
resolved by elected officials…logic is that elected officials are more accountable to the public and can 
best represent public’s interests…also [they] are more likely to understand the political implications of 
their decisions. The connection between immigration and foreign affairs, national security, and similar 
policy fields has often resulted in courts invoking this doctrine. 
Lack of Capacity: Courts are designed to adjudicate legal issues and simply lack the institutional capacity 
to make political judgments. Immigration law is inherently political because it’s created entirely within 
the political branches… 
Uniformity: The specifics of immigration…regulated by federal-level political branch policies. If lower 
courts become too involved in this process and craft unique statutory interpretations… strong likelihood 
of an inconsistent immigration system that varies from one jurisdiction to another. This would…be in 
direct violation of the Constitution, which requires a “uniform rule of naturalization”. 
Immigration Enforcement NOT Punishment: SCOTUS has held that due process protections apply when 
an individual faces punishment in the form of deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but that an alien 
being returned to his homeland or denied entry to the United States is not being punished and therefore 
cannot expect courts to grant him these protections. 
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particularly uniformity and stare decisis, were judicial justifications for establishing immigration 
regulation as a political and not a judicial decision. 
In order to establish the federal government’s supremacy and jurisdiction over American 
immigration policy, this paper will explore SCOTUS precedent relating to immigration law so as to 
better comprehend immigration legal history before analyzing and judging SB1070. The process of 
examining legal precedent regarding immigration policy begins with the establishment of Plenary 
Power. 
Immigration in the US became a more obvious and controversial political issue about a century 
ago, leading to landmark rulings by SCOTUS to establish the federal government’s political branches 
as the regulators and enforcers of immigration policy. One of the first significant immigration rulings 
was Chae Chan Ping (CCP) v. United States [1889]. SCOTUS examined the case, also known as the 
“Chinese Exclusion Case,” of a Chinese laborer who was refused re-entry into the US24. Presiding 
over Mr. Ping’s case, SCOTUS unanimously upheld the labourer’s exclusion and recognized the 
federal government’s inherent power to exclude non-citizens, despite such a power not being granted 
                                                                                                                                                             
History: The great weight of legal authority is in support of judicial deference to the political branches on 
the issue of immigration. The concept of stare decisis…ensures the plenary power doctrine cannot easily 
be abandoned.” 
24 Ibid 21, p3 
This case surrounded the issue of a Congressional law passed in 1882 law that prevented all future 
immigration of Chinese laborers into the US. In 1887, Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese immigrant residing in 
the US who left in 1887 for a brief trip to China, was denied re-entry into the country. Despite the 1882 
legislation containing a provision that granted the ability to leave and return to previously admitted 
Chinese laborers, such as Mr. Ping, this provision was discontinued by a new Congressional act in 1888 
during Mr. Ping’s return journey back to the US. Thus, upon his attempt to re-enter the US, he was denied 
entry. SCOTUS upheld his exclusion by recognizing the inherent power of the federal government to 
exclude non-citizens. The Court decided: 
“That the government of the United States through the action of the legislative department, can 
exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. 
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a 
part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the 
control of another power. (Chae Chan Ping v. United States [1889])” 
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in the Constitution25. This case established SCOTUS’ interpretation of immigration law: the political 
branches of government possess the authority to exclude aliens as they see fit. 
Immigration law precedent expanded three years later with Nishimura Ekiu v. United States 
[1892]. SCOTUS built upon precedent established in CCP with its outright rejection of an alien’s right 
to appeal the executive branch’s immigration decisions in court26. In Nisuimura Ekiu, a Japanese 
woman was denied entry into the US because of being deemed a “public charge,” by a federal 
immigration officer27. SCOTUS refused any claim of denied due process because it held that 
immigration enforcement is not a punishment and that alien deportation or refusal to entry is not a 
punishment, thus aliens are not entitled to a day in court28. Additionally, SCOTUS recognized the 
federal government’s jurisdiction and stated the immigration officer acted under the authority to deny 
entry as granted by an act of Congress, and that denied entry is not a violation of due process as long 
as exclusions and deportations act within the confinements expressed by an act of Congress29. 
                                                 
25 Ibid 24 
“Most significantly, the Court held that decisions by the ‘legislative department’ to exclude aliens are 
‘conclusive upon the judiciary’.” 
26 Ibid 24 
27 Ibid 24 
“A citizen of Japan, arrived in the United States by boat, claiming that she was to meet up with her 
husband. Ekiu did not know the husband’s address and carried only $22. For various reasons the 
immigration officer did not believe Ekiu and denied her entry under a statute that directed immigration 
officers to deny admission to anyone likely to become a public charge.” 
28 Ibid 24 
“Ekiu appealed her case up to the Supreme Court arguing that complete judicial defence to immigration 
decisions made by executive branch immigration officers amounted to a denial of due process. The Court 
disagreed. It held that the statute that empowered the immigration officials to make admission decisions 
also entrusted the final fact-finding to these officials.” 
29 Ibid 21, p4 
“The Court explained: 
‘The final determination of those facts may be entrusted by Congress to executive officers… a 
statute gives a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of 
certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other 
tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the 
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted [including SCOTUS]’. (Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States [1892])” 
 13 
Essentially, SCOTUS confirmed its understanding that the judicial branch’s responsibility was to not 
‘second-guess’ the political questions and decisions made in immigration decisions. 
SCOTUS furthered its interpretation of due process limits in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States [1893]. Here, SCOTUS held that: “[it is the] power of Congress… to expel and exclude 
aliens… from the country, may be exercised… [by] executive officers”30. The understanding of 
Congress’ and executive officers’ powers regarding immigration policy and its enforcement, in 
tandem with the continued belief that deportation is not a punishment, led SCOTUS to state that 
due process protections of the Constitution are not applicable to immigration cases31. Such 
precedent diminished non-citizen legal, and illegal, residents’ claims to due process and their 
ability to defend themselves in court. Heretofore, these three precedents, in addition to 
Shaughnessy v US ex rel. Mezei [1953], founded the political branches’ Plenary Power Doctrine 
on immigration and represent principles not yet overturned32. 
In fact, it took almost a century for SCOTUS, in its ruling on Landon v. Plasencia 
[1982], to find that aliens, who continuously work and are presently permanent residents of the 
US, should be protected by the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment in relating to 
                                                 
30 Ibid 29 
31 Ibid 29 
“The Court also held that: 
‘The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in 
which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of 
punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not 
complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting 
within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has determined that his 
continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law; and the provisions of the Constitution, securing the right of 
trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual 
punishments, have no application.’ (Fong Yue Ting v. United States [1893])” 
32 Ibid 21, p6 
Shaughnessy v. US ex rel. Mezei [1953] – established that a non-citizen facing exclusion was not entitled 
to due process whatsoever, even if the result was an indefinite detention and expulsion; SCOTUS 
determined that the courts cannot retry the determination of the Attorney General. 
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immigration cases33. By taking a hundred years to recognize and grant non-citizen legal residents 
with similar legal rights to those of citizens, instead of being recognized similarly to illegal 
residents in the eyes of the law, demonstrates the culture and stringent nature of this country’s 
immigration history. 
Adding to the precedent that established the federal government’s authority to develop 
and enforce immigration policy, further precedent and legislation clarify the jurisdiction of 
immigration policy and the role of states in regards to enforcing immigration law. 
Aforementioned, SCOTUS ruled the federal government possesses broad and exclusive power to 
regulate and enforce immigration policy, preempting any state and local laws that attempt to do 
so due to the Supremacy Clause34. An example of federal supremacy, the case of Hines v 
Davidowitz [1941], SCOTUS held that: 
“The regulation of aliens is so intimately blinded and intertwined with 
responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also 
acts on the same subject, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme; and the law of 
the state… must yield to it… states cannot…conflict or interfere with, curtail or 
compliment, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations. (Hines 
v Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 [1941])”35 
 
Even with established supremacy over immigration as granted to the federal government by 
SCOTUS and the Constitution, federal immigration policy does allow states and localities to 
independently regulate the employment of illegal aliens through licensing, enforce the criminal 
                                                 
33 Ibid 21, p10 
34 Price, Susan. OLR Research Report “State versus Federal Power to Regulate Immigration” 14 
November 2007. http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0621.htm  
Supremacy Clause (Article 6, Clause 1 of the US Constitution) invalidates and preempts state laws that 
interfere with or are contrary to Federal law. 
35 Ibid 34 
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provisions of the Immigration and Nationalities Act (INA), and check the status of anyone 
detained or arrested, even for minor crimes363738. 
Moreover, in specific circumstances state and local law enforcement officers and 
agencies can perform additional duties relating to immigration law enforcement39. In fact, INA 
Section 1357 (c) subsection 287 (g) allows local law enforcement agencies to check the 
immigration status of anyone arrested, even minor offenses, through the State Department’s 
database40. This program remains different to SB1070 in that this program, initiated by federal 
law and supported by the Obama Administration, applies only to persons already incarcerated 
whilst SB1070 grants Arizona state and local police the ability to determine the immigration 
status of persons before arrest and incarceration41. Thus, despite the defined federal supremacy 
over immigration policy and the limited capacity state and local law enforcement agencies can 
enforce federal immigration policy, Arizona still acted outside the authorized 287(g) program 
and SB1070 remains controversial and works against federal supremacy and precedent. 
                                                 
36 Ibid 34 
“’Licensing’ encompasses: “lawful state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or 
refusal to reissue a license to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions” of 
federal law” (H.R. Rep. 99-682, 1986 USCAN 5649, 5662) 
37 Ibid 34 
States and localities may enforce the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationalities Act (8 USC 
1101, et seq.) 
“Section 1252 (c) grants states and local law enforcement ability to arrest and detain aliens illegally 
present in US who have prior felony convictions.” 
38 Ibid 34 
“States and local law enforcement efforts cannot impose new or additional penalties upon criminal 
immigration law violators” 
39 Ibid 34 
INA Section 1357 (c) subsection 287 (g) states that “the U.S. Attorney General is permitted to enter 
agreements with states and localities to permit their law enforcement officers to perform additional duties 
relating to immigration law enforcement.” 
40 Chicago Tribune, “Immigration: A state or Federal Power?” 13 July, 2010. 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-13/news/ct-oped-0713-byrne-20100713_1_immigration-
status-arizona-law-obama  
41 Ibid 40 
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2.3 THIRD SECTION: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 
2.3.1 First Subsection: Debate over SB1070’s Constitutionality 
In order to determine the constitutionality and legitimacy of SB1070 after establishing the federal 
government’s jurisdiction and supremacy regarding immigration policy, this section will investigate 
SB1070 and legal arguments and decisions concerning the law. In order to establish a legal analysis of 
SB1070, this section will begin with the ruling of SCOTUS. Per the power of Judicial Review, 
SCOTUS’ ruling is the constitutional understanding of an issue or policy area until another court case 
challenges state level immigration policy. Listed below are the four controversial sections of SB1070: 
Section 2(b): 
‘“For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by [an Arizona] law enforcement 
official or a law enforcement agency . . . in the enforcement of any other law or 
ordinance of a county, city or town [of] this state where reasonable suspicion 
exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, a 
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration 
status of the person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an 
investigation. Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration 
status determined before the person is released. The person’s immigration status 
shall be verified with the federal government pursuant to 8 United States Code 
section 1373(c) . . . A person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully 
present in the United States if the person provides to the law enforcement officer 
or agency any of the following:  
1. A valid Arizona driver license.  
2. A valid Arizona non-operating identification license.  
3. A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal identification.  
4. If the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United States before 
issuance, any valid United States federal, state or local government issued 
identification.”’42 
Section 3: 
‘“In addition to any violation of Federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to 
complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 
United States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a)”43 
                                                 
42 Judge Paez. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, State of Arizona et al. v United States. 2011. 11 April 
2011. http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2011/04/11/10-16645_opinion.pdf p4815 
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            Section 5(c):  
‘“It is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the United States and 
who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public 
place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.”’44 
Section 6: 
“‘[A] peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has 
probable cause to believe . . . [t]he person to be arrested has committed any public 
offense that makes the person removable from the United States.’”45 
 
This section will first begin with an analysis of SCOTUS’ ruling on SB1070 and then conduct an 
independent analysis of the Arizona law, deeming SCOTUS’ ruling incomplete and that all 
controversial elements of SB1070 must be preempted by the federal government. 
SCOTUS, on 25 June 2012, handed down its opinion regarding SB1070 in Arizona et al v 
US.  SCOTUS held that: 
“The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immigration and alien 
status rests, in part, on its constitutional power to, “establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization,” Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and on its inherent sovereign power to control 
and conduct foreign relations, see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10”46. 
 
Additionally, SCOTUS defines the scope and duty of federal immigration law, such as the 
requirement of aliens entering the country to register with the federal government and to carry 
“proof of [their] status”47. With these responsibilities, however, SCOTUS declared that the 
federal government still retains the power “to preempt a state law” as granted by the Supremacy 
                                                                                                                                                             
43 Ibid 42 p4829-30 
44 Ibid 42 p4833 
45 Ibid 42 p4840 
46 567 U. S. ____ (2012) p1 
47 Ibid 46 p1,2  
“Federal law specifies categories of aliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8U. S. 
C. §1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status, §§1304(e), 
1306(a); imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a; and specifies which 
aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so, see §1227. Removal is a civil matter, and one of 
its principal features ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES Syllabus is the broad discretion exercised by 
immigration officials, who must decide whether to pursue removal at all. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for 
identifying, apprehending, and removing illegal aliens. It also operates the Law Enforcement Support 
Center, which provides immigration status information to federal, state, and local officials around the 
clock.” 
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Clause48. With the power of preemption, the federal government can remove state law from 
statute, as state law must make way for supreme federal jurisdiction, if one of two circumstances 
are met: “States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined 
must be regulated by its exclusive governance,” in that Congress has removed any ability for the 
state to act in such a policy area, or where a federal interest is “so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject”; or if the 
state law is preempted by federal law49. 
In analyzing SB1070, SCOTUS found Section 2(b) to not presently violate the 
supremacy clause and that it could work in tandem with federal immigration policy. Despite 
agreeing with earlier federal judicial rulings regarding SB1070, as set forth by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeal regarding the decision to preempt Sections 3, 5(c) and 6 of SB1070, SCOTUS 
ruled it is too early to predict whether Section 2(b) violates the Constitution or is preempted by 
federal supremacy50. SCOTUS believes that, “The mandatory nature of the status checks does 
not interfere with the federal immigration scheme” for, “Consultation between federal and state 
officials is an important feature of the immigration system… Congress has encouraged the 
                                                 
48 Ibid 46 p2 
“The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. A statute may contain an express 
preemption provision, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. 
___, ___, but state law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, States 
are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its 
exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115. Intent 
can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 
230. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand “as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67.” 
49 Ibid 48 
50 Ibid 46 p2,3 
“It was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without 
some showing that §2(B)’s enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives.” 
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sharing of information about possible immigration violations §§1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c)”51. Due 
to its interpretation that the 1357(g) program is an overarching program, SCOTUS argues 
SB1070 fulfills the state’s requirement to enforce federal immigration policy at the state and 
local level for they will consult with the federal government regarding the residency status of 
those detained. This perception of the 1357(g) program conflicts with Congress’ original intent 
and potentially opens the door for racial profiling to occur. Additionally, SCOTUS’ 
understanding of 1357(g) state level authorized programs failed to address a key component of 
authorizing such provisions, a requirement that will later be examined in the independent legal 
analysis. 
Additionally, SCOTUS included a warning in its own remarks about its removing the 
injunction on Section 2(b). SCOTUS declared that, “It is not clear at this stage and on this record 
that §2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay the release of detainees for no reason 
other than to verify their immigration status”52. This potential for the law to be used for reasons 
other than check the status of those believed to be involved with criminal activity in any way is 
dangerous. Furthermore, if this law were used as the sole reason for detaining persons, it could 
incite instances of racial profiling, which is unconstitutional and taught to Arizona law 
enforcement officers as unacceptable5354. SCOTUS believes that a specific reading of Section 
2(b) will not lead to numerous interpretations of enforcing the law and that, with no conclusive 
                                                 
51 Ibid 46 p3 
52 Ibid 46 p4 
53 Ibid 46 p3,4 
“[Law enforcement] officers may not consider race, color, or national origin “except to the extent 
permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]”; and §2(B) must be “implemented in a 
manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and 
respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” 
54 Ibid 46 p4 
SB1070 could “disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in 
custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision.” 
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evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to prove Section 2(b) establishes racial profiling and 
violates the equal protection clause55. Despite this faith in the potential for Section 2(b), 
SCOTUS included that their opinion on the matter is not final until there is conclusive evidence 
that will determine Section 2(b)’s constitutionality56. 
SCOTUS’ analysis of the additional controversial Sections, 3, 5 and 6, iterates these 
components of SB1070 are, “preempted by federal law”57. Sections 3 and 5 reiterate federal law at the 
state level and are thus preempted by the Supremacy Clause58. Additionally, SCOTUS ruled that 
                                                 
55 Ibid 46 p4 
According to SCOTUS, “If the law only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course 
of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision would likely survive 
preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law 
and its objectives.” 
56 Ibid 46 p4 
“Without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to 
assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that conflicts with federal law. Cf.  Fox v.  Washington, 236 U. 
S. 273, 277.  This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as 
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.” 
57 Ibid 46 p2 
58 Ibid 46 p2,3 
“(a) Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for 
States to regulate. In Hines, a state alien-registration program was struck down on the ground that 
Congress intended its “complete” federal registration plan to be a “single integrated and all-embracing 
system.” 312 U. S., at 74. That scheme did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal law or 
“enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. The federal registration framework remains 
comprehensive. Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is 
impermissible. 
(b) Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty stands as an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), a comprehensive framework for “combating the 
employment of illegal aliens,” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147, makes it 
illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. 
S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and requires employers to verify prospective employees’ employment 
authorization status, §§1324a(a)(1)(B), (b). It imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, 
§§1324a(e)(4), (f), but only civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment, 
e.g., §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8). IRCA’s express preemption provision, though silent about whether additional 
penalties may be imposed against employees, “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption 
principles” or impose a “special burden” making it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws 
falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 869–872. The correct 
instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be 
inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. It follows that a state law to the 
contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. 
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Section 6 produces “an obstacle to federal law,” as it, “attempts to provide state officers with even 
greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government,” 
which is a provision and power not devised by Congress in the federal immigration system59. 
 The language of Section 2(b), however, seems to contest with SCOTUS’ analysis regarding 
this controversial component of SB1070. With conflicting wording and ambiguity between sentences 
as well as varying levels of rigor with which to establish the credibility of someone’s legal status in the 
state, it is difficult to imagine there not being various understandings of implementation and certain 
aspects of the law being enforced more broadly than others. Furthermore, the standards Arizona 
established in Section 2(b) re-iterate federal law at the state level, and by the federal power of 
preemption Section 2(b) must be removed from statute. 
In order to demonstrate how all the controversial sections of SB1070 are unconstitutional, this 
section’s independent legal analysis will focus primarily on Section 2(b) as well as the three additional 
controversial sections of the law. In accordance with SCOTUS’ ruling, Section 3, 5 and 6 of SB1070 
do not possess conflicting language and work in conjunction with federal immigration policy, as they 
re-iterate federal law at the state level, or pose an obstacle to federal supremacy as previously outlined. 
                                                 
59 Ibid 46 p3 
“By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of certain aliens suspected of being 
removable, §6 too creates an obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable 
alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien 
during the removal process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue a warrant for trained 
federal immigration officers to execute. If no federal warrant has been issued, these officers have more 
limited authority. They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any 
[immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a 
warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with even greater 
arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government. This is not 
the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may 
perform an immigration officer’s functions. This includes instances where the Attorney General has 
granted that authority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See, e.g., §1357(g)(1). 
Although federal law permits state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, 
apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” §1357(g)(10)(B), 
this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain authorized by §6.” 
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Because of these reasons, as outlined by SCOTUS, these sections are unconstitutional and were 
properly preempted by federal law. 
The language of Section 2(b), however, remains a matter of concern. SCOTUS found that this 
section’s language worked in tandem with federal provisions, but upon further investigation the first 
and final sentences, in face value reading and basic language analysis, establish a looser, more 
ambiguous standard of interpreting and executing SB1070 for law enforcement officers than the more 
rigidly and unambiguously written second and third sentences. Reading these sentences at face value, 
as conducted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, depicts the conflict of language established by the 
Arizona state legislature in their composition of this law. For example, the second sentence, unlike its 
predecessor, contains unambiguous language such as the all encompassing and mandatory “any” and 
“shall,” as well as the definitive phrase “determined before… release”; this contrasts the first 
sentence’s ambiguous language, which stated “reasonable attempts… when practicable”60. The state of 
Arizona argues that Section 2(b) does not require officers to determine the immigration status of every 
arrested person, and that the language of the second sentence works in tandem with first sentence if 
there is reasonable suspicion6162. However, this face value reading, in addition to the Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
60 Ibid 42 p 4815 
The two sentences described are as follows: 
Sentence 1: “For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by [an Arizona] law enforcement official or a 
law enforcement agency . . . in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a county, city or town 
[of] this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the 
United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status 
of the person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation.” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 11-1051(B) (2010); Judge Paez, 4815) 
Sentence 2: “Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the 
person is released” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010); Judge Paez, 4815) 
61 Ibid 42 p4816 
“Thus Arizona argues its officers are only required to verify the immigration status of an arrested person 
before release if reasonable suspicion exists that the person lacks proper documentation”. 
62 Dever, Sheriff M., Amicus Curiae Brief. p12-13 2 September 2010 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/10/25/amicus.brief15.pdf  
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Court of Appeals’ analysis, determines that the text does not support the state’s interpretation of 
SB107063. 
The third and fifth sentences of Section 2(b) prove to be the most interesting and confusing to 
analyze at face value. The third sentence establishes the requirements of determining someone’s status 
before releasing him or her, while the fifth provides several forms of identification that provide a 
presumption of someone’s legal documentation64. As orchestrated in Judge Paez’s interpretation of 
this language, these sentences of the same section propose the implementation of two different and 
unrelated standards of verifying residency statuses65. The former proposes verifying identities with the 
federal government, as pursuant to INA standards, while the latter describes several forms of 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Under Arizona rules of statutory construction, courts generally have "a duty to interpret statutes in a 
manner that does not render the statute meaningless" and should "avoid rendering any of its language 
mere surplusage."  John C. Lincoln Hospital and Health Corp. v. Maricopa County,  208 Ariz. 532, 541, 
96 P.3d 530, 539 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004);  In re Aaron M.,  204 Ariz. 152, 154, 61 P.3d 34, 36 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003). The district court's interpretation of the second sentence of Section 2(B) violates this rule. 
Requiring law enforcement officers verify the immigration status of each and every arrestee renders the 
word "arrest" in the first sentence 7 Case: 10-16645   09/02/2010   Page: 12 of 21    ID: 7462216   
DktEntry: 44-2meaningless and is pure surplusage because the first sentence clearly provides that 
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence is required for verification of an arrestee's immigration status. 
However, reading the second sentence to mean that reasonable suspicion is required and that verification 
must only be completed prior to the release of the arrestee does in fact give meaning to all the words 
(specifically "arrest") in both the first and second sentences of Section 2(B). Therefore, the district's court 
interpretation was improper and the proper interpretation is that the second sentence must be read in 
conjunction with the first.” 
63 Ibid 42 p4817 
“Reasonable suspicion requirement in first sentence does not modify the plain meaning of the second 
sentence.” 
64 Ibid 42 
The two sentences described are as follows: 
Sentence 3: “The person’s immigration status shall be verified with the federal government pursuant to 8 
United States Code section 1373(c)” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010); Judge Paez, 4815) 
Sentence 5: “A person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States if the 
person provides to the law enforcement officer or agency any of the following:  
1. A valid Arizona driver license.  
2. A valid Arizona non-operating identification license.  
3. A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal identification.  
4. If the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United States before issuance, any valid United 
States federal, state or local government issued identification.” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) 
(2010); Judge Paez, 4815) 
65 Ibid 42 p4817 
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identification that provide an acceptable presumption of someone’s legal documentation. Though the 
standard of accepting presumptions of one’s legal documentation re-iterates the federal government’s 
standard as outlined by the REAL ID Act of 200566, the inconsistency between these sentences within 
SB1070 appears to undermine the legitimacy of both sentences and could create a double standard for 
implementation. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ understanding of Section 2(b)’s 
language requires law enforcement officers to verify the immigration status of all arrestees before their 
release with the federal government, regardless of whether or not reasonable suspicion exists that said 
arrestees are undocumented immigrants67. Though, as already discovered in Section 2 of this chapter, 
INA establishes that incarcerated persons will have their identity confirmed; thus federal law, as 
guaranteed by the Supremacy clause, preempts this component of SB107068. 
The specifics of Section 2(b), particularly the first sentence, in which a law enforcement officer 
can ask for anyone’s identification, appears in violation of one’s privacy and 4th and 5th constitutional 
amendment rights69. Despite the potential infringement on constitutional rights, SCOTUS precedent 
establish that it is quite legal and constitutionally sound for law enforcement officers to possess only 
                                                 
66 Department of Homeland Security Press Office, 20 December 2012. “DHS Determines 13 States Meet 
REAL ID Standards”, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/12/20/dhs-determines-13-states-meet-real-id-
standards  
In the final sentence of Section 2(b), a list of acceptable forms of identification is listed. Amongst this list 
are government issued licenses, such as state issued drivers licenses. The federal government, since the 
passing of the REAL ID Act of 2005 allows for certain states’ drivers licenses as acceptable forms of 
identification. However, only 13 states by December 2012 had enacted adequate standards for their state’s 
driver’s licenses to be acceptable forms of identification at federal run institutions. Arizona was not one 
of these 13 states, but the standard of accepting IDs is the same. Because of this reiteration of standards at 
the state level, the federal government can preempt this state law. 
67 Ibid 42 p4817 
68 Ibid 42 p4812, Supremacy Clause preempts state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law 
69 Eng, James. NBC News. “Next step for Arizona Immigration law: back to the courts?” 26 June 2012. 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/26/12420482-next-stop-for-arizona-immigration-law-back-
to-the-courts?lite  
Some activist groups and political pundits argued prior to SCOTUS ruling that SB1070 violated 4th and 
5th amendment rights of citizens and legal residents. NBC News example: “Among the possible claims are 
that the provision violates the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
that it invites racial profiling, ACLU officials say.” 
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‘reasonable suspicion’, not even ‘probable cause’, in order to stop anyone they see fit and request that 
person’s name and appropriate identification70. 
This extensive power and re-defining of the constitutional rights arose from Terry v. Ohio 
[1968]. Terry stops, or “stop-and-identify” laws, allow law enforcement officers to stop and question 
anyone they suspect of “being involved in, about to be involved in, or is in the process of carrying out 
a crime”71. Acquiring personal information through a Terry stop, according to SCOTUS, is not 
unconstitutional72. In fact, active failure to comply with such police requests is a punishable offence, 
which upon incarceration the law enforcement officers have the right to acquire your identification and 
verify it with the federal government73. Law enforcement agencies were given these powers to 
determine whether their officers may be in any present danger or if the person in question was wanted 
for committing, or in the process of committing, a crime74. Due to Terry v Ohio and Hiibel v 6th 
Judicial District Court of Nevada, the provisions within the first sentence of Section 2(b) do not 
                                                 
70 Warren, C.J. SCOTUS. Cornell School of Law. “Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [1968]”. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0392_0001_ZO.html  
“Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that 
his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person 
believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that 
individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed.” 
71 Ibid 70, “The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police 
officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed 
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” 
72 Ibid 70, “The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the 
inquiry as whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations 
upon the [p29] scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation. Compare 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-356 (1967). The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that "limitations upon the 
fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself." United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (C.A.2d 
Cir.1930); see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-635 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-221 (1960). Thus, evidence may not be introduced 
if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the 
justification for their initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)” 
73 Ibid 70 
74 Ibid 70 
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violate the 4th and 5th amendments of the Constitution, thus not making SB1070 unconstitutional for 
this claim75. 
                                                 
75 Hiibel v 6th District Court of Nevada 542 U.S. 177 [2004]. Cornell School of Law. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/03-5554#writing-ZO  
The law enforcement officer asking for identification “did not violate Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Ordinarily, an investigating officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the 
Amendment. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, the 
Court…recognized that an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal 
activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate 
further. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself during 
a Terry stop… it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal 
to answer, … The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to 
disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop… The Nevada statute is consistent with Fourth 
Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures because it properly balances the 
intrusion on the individual’s interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests. 
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648. An identity request has an immediate relation to the Terry stop’s 
purpose, rationale, and practical demands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request 
does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself, 
changing neither its duration nor its location. Hiibel argues unpersuasively that the statute circumvents the 
probable-cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious, thereby 
creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary police conduct…They are met by the requirement that 
a Terry stop be justified at its inception and be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified” the initial stop. Terry , 392 U. S., at 20. Under those principles, an officer may not arrest a 
suspect for failure to identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to the 
circumstances justifying the stop. Cf.Hayes v. Florida, 470 U. S. 811. The request in this case was a 
commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded 
insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s requirement of a response did not contravene 
the Fourth Amendment. 
“Hiibel’s contention that…conviction violates…Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on self-incrimination 
fails because disclosure of his name and identity presented no reasonable danger of incrimination. 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating, see Brown v. Walker, 161 
U. S. 591, and protects only against disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a 
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used, Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U. S. 441. Hiibel’s refusal to disclose was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his 
name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish evidence needed to prosecute 
him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479. It appears he refused to identify himself only because he 
thought his name was none of the officer’s business. While the Court recognizes his strong belief that he 
should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s 
judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him. 
Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant as to be incriminating only in 
unusual circumstances…If a case arises where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at 
the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the 
individual of a separate offense, the court can then consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege 
applies, whether it has been violated, and what remedy must follow.” 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion on State of Arizona et al. v United States of 
America [2011] also recognized that Section 2(b) was not a violation of constitutional rights and that 
law enforcement officers, who possessed ‘reasonable suspicion,’ could pull anyone aside and ask for 
his or her identification76. 
The majority of controversial elements of SB1070 have been preempted as they interfere with 
Congress’ immigration policy scheme; however, as established in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruling, Section 2(b) also met one of the two circumstances for federal preemption as it also interferes 
with Congress’ immigration policy scheme as Arizona plans to direct its officers in how to enforce 
immigration law contrary to that established in federal immigration law7778. The Ninth Circuit Court 
continues by describing how SB1070, though it could abide by the INA 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) exception of 
state and local law enforcement officers working for the federal government to implement federal 
immigration law, fails to abide by the provisions of these limited and directed programs as Arizona 
failed to meet the quintessential requirement of working in tandem with and by sole direction of the 
Attorney General7980. This is the case because Arizona interferes with the federal government’s 
                                                 
76 Ibid 42 p4816 
77 Ibid 42 p4812 
Federal Preemption Doctrine was established in Supremacy Clause Article 6 Clause 2 of the Constitution, 
in addition with, 
“Fundamental principle of Constitution…that Congress has the power to preempt state law” 
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,372 (2000) 
78 Ibid4 2 p4819-4822 
79 Ibid 42 p4818-4819 
Congress listed conditions in which state and local officials are permitted to assist the executive in 
enforcing immigration laws in that Congress allows the Attorney General to enter into “written 
agreement[s] with State[s]”, thus allowing the Attorney General to recruit state and local law 
enforcement, when qualified, to perform a function of an immigration officer – investigation, 
apprehension of aliens in US (8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(1)). Subsection 3 of this provision provides such people 
of the state to be subject to direction and supervision of the Attorney General; Subsection 5 requires 
written agreement must specify the powers and duties granted to the individual, the duration of said 
powers and the role and oversight the Attorney General will supervise said individual with. 
80 Ibid 42 p4823 
 28 
authority to implement priorities and strategies in law enforcement by imposing mandatory obligations 
on state and local officers, as stressed in sentences 2 and 381. Moreover, because the Attorney General 
is not directing the state of Arizona to enforce immigration policy at the state level through the 
1357(g) program, Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers retain no jurisdiction or ability to 
enforce their state level immigration law under INA 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)82. 
Section 2(b) further conflicts with federal law as it poses a risk to Congress’ intent and 
undermines the President’s intended statutory authority in relations to implementing and enforcing 
immigration policy, again fulfilling one of the circumstances for federal preemption of state law as 
granted by the Supremacy Clause83. Specific SCOTUS precedent establishes the extent to which 
SB1070 affects federal authority: 
“1) Section 2(b)’s ‘unyielding’ mandatory directives to Arizona’s law enforcement 
“undermines the President’s intended statutory authority” to establish immigration 
enforcement priorities and strategies 
 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377 
2) Is an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of full purpose and objectives of 
Congress in INA provisions for SB1070 subverts Congress’ intent of state discretion 
and close supervision by the Attorney General. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Arizona argues in INA Provision 8 U.S.C. 1373(c), that “Congress has expressed a clear intent to 
encourage the assistance from state and local law enforcement officers” as 1373(c) creates obligation for 
the Department of Homeland Security to “respond to an inquiry by a federal, state or local government 
agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual…for any 
purpose authorized by law”. Argument is preempted by fact Congress contemplated state assistance of 
identifying undocumented immigrants within the boundaries established in INA 1357(g), and not in a 
manner dictated by a state law that furthers a state immigration policy. In fact, Congress directed 
appropriate federal agency to respond to state inquiries about immigration status at the time it authorized 
Attorney General to enter into 1357(g) agreements with states, making Arizona’s argument invalid. 
81 Ibid 80 
82 Ibid 42 p4824 
By imposing its own mandatory obligations on state and local officers, Arizona’s SB1070 interferes with 
Federal government’s authority to implement priorities and strategies in law enforcement. Thus Section 
2(b) interferes with Congress’ delegation of discretion to Executive branch in enforcing INA without the 
Attorney General’s consent. 
83 Ibid 82 
Judge Paez states that in Crosby, 530 U.S. 363, SCOTUS found that state law is preempted because it 
poses an obstacle to Congress’ intent and that state law undermines the President’s intended statutory 
authority by interpreting and enforcing immigration policy at the state level. 
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 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 
3) SB1070 has caused actual foreign policy problems 
If a state law produced something more than incidental effect in conflict with foreign 
policy of national gov’t, state law would be required to be preempted 
 539 U.S. at 420 Garamendi”84 
 
In fact, SB1070 has caused actual foreign policy problems for the American federal government, 
problems beyond the scope of incidental standard provided in Garamendi85. Numerous foreign 
governments and leaders have publicly criticized the Arizona law: 
“The Presidents of Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the 
governments of Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Nicaragua; the national 
assemblies in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Central American Parliament; six 
human rights experts at the United Nations; the Secretary General and many 
permanent representatives of the Organization of American States; the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights; and the Union of South American 
Nations.”86 
 
As SB1070 caused a substantial international incident, the federal government, as dictated in 
Garamendi, must preempt SB1070 and ensure the law cannot produce any further foreign policy 
problems87. 
Section 3 and Section 5(c), unlike Section 2(b), reiterated federal law at the state level, thus are 
redundant policies and violate the Supremacy clause by making federal crimes state level offenses88. 
Section 3 provides: 
“In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to 
complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 United 
States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a)”89. 
 
Section 5(c) provides:  
                                                 
84 Ibid 42 p4825,2826 
85 Ibid 42 p4826 
86 Ibid 85 
87 Ibid 42 p4827 
Adding to the case of SB1070 causing an international incident, Deputy Secretary of State, James B. 
Steinberg, attested SB1070 threatens numerous different “serious harms to US foreign relations” 
88 Ibid 42 p4830-4832 
89 Ibid 43 
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“It is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the United States and 
who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public 
space or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state”90. 
 
Both of these sections reiterate federal law at the state level, making it a state level offence for 
unauthorized immigrants to violate federal registration laws91. The interpretation of this conflict is 
clear: they are redundant and preempted by federal law. Though Arizona argues Section 3 is not 
preempted because Congress, “invited states to reinforce federal alien classifications,” nothing in the 
text of INA’s registration provisions indicates Congress intended for states to actively participate in 
enforcement or punishment of federal immigration registration rules92. Because of this, the federal 
government, as issued by SCOTUS, retains the ability to federal preemption as these sections attempt 
to establish authority in a policy area the federal government left no room for states to work in. 
Furthermore: 
“Where federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority… has enacted a 
complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration 
of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or 
interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary 
regulations,” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-6793. 
 
This proves, in conjunction with Congress providing very specific directions for state participation in 8 
U.S.C. 1357 – which mentions no state participation in the registration scheme – and that the INA 
contains registration, documentation and possession of proof schemes, that there is sufficient evidence 
to show Congress knew how to ask for help and that the state of Arizona exceeded its limited 
                                                 
90 Ibid 44 
91 Ibid 7 
Section 3 is in violation of federal supremacy as it punishes unauthorized immigrants for failing to 
comply with federal registration laws, which is not a field that states traditionally occupy per Wyeth, 129 
S.Ct. at 1194 
92 Ibid 88 
93 Ibid 88 
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jurisdiction94. From this analysis of SB1070 and federal immigration policy and law, the federal 
government should preempt all SB1070’s controversial sections. 
Despite this, proponents for SB1070 stress that the case brought against the strict immigration 
policy fail to put forth credible evidence proving the law’s illegality. According to Arizona State 
Senator Russell Pearce, none of the sections of SB1070 should have active injunctions emplaced upon 
them for the “series of law enforcement provisions enacted…do not determine who should or should 
not be admitted into the country,” and nor do they, “create additional conditions,” by which lawfully 
residing aliens may “remain in the country”95. This clause within his amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals appears to counter the state’s intended intent of SB1070, which attempts to make the 
carrying of identification papers mandatory for all persons within Arizona’s borders. Failure to abide 
by this provision could lead to expulsion or at least examination of one’s identity with the federal 
government; regardless of the outcome, SB1070 seems to establish conditions for those living within 
the state of Arizona. 
Continuing his argument, the state senator believes that instead of fulfilling the standard 
required to enact injunctions upon SB1070, the district court when, “required to find that under no set 
of circumstances could [SB1070] be applied constitutionally,” failed and used, “several speculative, 
hypothetical applications of the provisions and found that these applications mandated that it enjoin 
the provisions from taking effect”96. Even though the senator rationalizes the passing of SB1070 as an 
act by the state government to, “enact a series of law enforcement provisions…[in order to] protect its 
citizens from serious public safety concerns,” the senator’s and the state’s argument of there not being 
                                                 
94 Ibid 88 
95 Pearce, Senator Russell. Amicus Brief Westlaw. “2010 WL 5162516” p4 
96 Ibid 95 
 32 
enough evidence to preempt or enact injunctions against SB1070 fail to abide by established legal 
precedent, a simple reading of their own law and the Supremacy Clause97. 
Instead of simply adding to a state’s ability to enact legislation to defend its citizenry or 
violating constitutional rights, SB1070 violated the federal government’s supremacy and 
immigration policy structure by preempting federal jurisdiction; because of this and the sheer 
number of violations of legal precedent and federal laws aforementioned, SB1070 represents an 
unconstitutional piece of legislation enacted by a member-state actor circumventing centralized 
authority. The state law, including Section 2(b), should be removed from statute by federal 
preemption. 
2.3.2 Second Subsection: Why in the year 2010?  
Despite claiming SB1070 as a necessity to combat illegal immigration and protect the citizenry 
of Arizona, proponents for the stringent Arizona law, in addition to its established 
unconstitutionality, enacted a law that does not support their arguments. In order to establish why 
Arizona passed SB1070 in 2010, a main cause for the state’s aggressive action is required. 
According to Governor Jan Brewer, SB1070 was desperately needed as illegal immigration 
continues to become a supposedly ever-worsening problem that the federal government neglects 
to address98. 
                                                 
97 Ibid 95 
98 Brewer, Governor Jan. 
p1,2 “Border-related violence and crime due to illegal immigration are critically important issues to the 
people of our state, to my Administration and to me, as your Governor and as a citizen. Here is no higher 
priority than protecting the citizens of Arizona. We cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of 
drug cartels. We cannot stand idly by as drop houses, kidnappings and violence compromise our quality 
of life. We cannot delay while the destruction happening south of our international border creeps its way 
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Claims requiring action in 2010 to address an increasing problem appear to be 
disingenuous, as information released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shows 
that illegal immigration, over the past several years, has diminished due to the economic 
recession and improved economic situation in Mexico99. Based on statistics that classify 
unauthorized immigrants as, “all foreign-born non-citizens who are not legal residents,” the DHS 
estimated the level of unauthorized residents in the US, using the 2000 and 2010 census 
information to compensate the figures, being about 11.6 million persons in 2010, down from the 
height of the unauthorized person population of 11.8 million in 2007100101. 
Though illegal immigration continued, over the past decade the increase of illegal 
immigrants entering the US diminished. As depicted by the DHS, the height of the unauthorized 
immigrant population in the US was 2007. To further supplant the statistics that illegal 
immigration is no longer as paramount an issue as in the past, the DHS discovered the peak of 
                                                                                                                                                             
north. We in Arizona have been more than patient waiting for Washington to act. But decades of federal 
inaction and misguided policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation.“ 
99 Hoefer, Michael & Rytina, Nancy& Backer, Bryan. Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Immigration Statistics, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the US: January 
2011” March 2012. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf  
p3 “It is unlikely that the unauthorized immigrant population increased [after 2007] given relatively high 
U.S. unemployment, improved economic conditions in Mexico, record low numbers of apprehensions of 
unauthorized immigrants at U.S. borders, and greater levels of border enforcement.” 
100 Ibid 99 
This is the process by which the DHS conducted this survey and report. 
“This report provides estimates of the size of the unauthorized immigrant population residing in the US as 
of January 2011 by period of entry, region and country of origin, state of residence, age, and sex. The 
estimates were obtained using the “residual” methodology employed for previous estimates of the 
unauthorized population (see Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, 2011). The unauthorized immigrant population 
is the remainder or “residual” after the legally resident foreign-born population—legal permanent 
residents (LPRs), naturalized citizens, asylees, refugees, and nonimmigrants—is subtracted from the total 
foreign-born population. Data to estimate the legally resident population were obtained primarily from the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whereas the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. 
Census Bureau was the source for estimates of the total foreign-born population.” 
101 Ibid 99 p2,3 
 34 
illegal immigration into the US being between 1995 and 2004102. The DHS found that of the 11.5 
million unauthorized immigrants in the US by 2011, only 1.58 million entered the US after 2005, 
in contrast to the higher levels during 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 with 3.03 and 3.33 million 
respectively, demonstrating illegal immigration is becoming a less severe problem103. Though 
the entire nation’s illegal immigrant influx lessened after 2004, did Arizona’s increase? 
Analogous with the national trend, the state of Arizona’s illegal immigration population 
grew by a steadily smaller number since 2000. In fact, the unauthorized population in Arizona 
only increased by an additional 30,000 by 2011 since 2000104. Also, Arizona’s estimated 
population of unauthorized residences in 2011 represents only 3.12% of illegal immigrants in the 
country, ninth in the listed states in the DHS’ recent survey estimates105. 
Thus, if SB1070 was issued to address an ever-increasing problem in the US and 
Arizona, governmental statistics show despite the overall unauthorized residence population 
increasing in the US, it does so by a diminishing rate.  Furthermore, the average annual change 
estimated by the DHS for the state of Arizona was calculated to be less than plus 3,000 persons a 
year, far less than California and Texas, two other states that border Mexico and represent 
gateways for Central and Southern American immigrants106. Nationally, the influx of illegal 
immigration began to subside almost a decade ago, so such a stringent immigration policy, with 
all constitutional arguments aside, is not as needed as during the 1990’s. As its first two attempts 
to pass similar legislation failed due to former Governor Napolitano’s continued vetoes, Arizona, 
                                                 
102 Ibid 99 p3 
103 Ibid 99 p3 
104 Ibid 99 p5 
105 Ibid 99 p5 
106 Ibid 99 p5 
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despite the diminishing influx of illegal immigrants, may have wanted to pass the legislation 
once a Republican was governor. 
Another reason for why Arizona may have enacted SB1070 is because Arizona represents 
one of 31 state members of the group “State Legislators for Legal Immigration”107. Described as 
a “network of state legislators,” these states signed a pledge to work in tandem with federal, state 
and local government officials in order to, “eliminate all economic attractions and incentives for 
illegal aliens, as well as securing our borders against unlawful invasion”108. Such strong and 
direct language implicates the extreme nature and nationalist tendencies these legislators possess 
regarding illegal immigration and possible illegal immigrants entering this country. 
Whether this group influenced and helped articulate SB1070 and furthered state level 
immigration policies across the US, or whether SB1070 was an action taken by a Republican-led 
state legislator so as to rally the electoral base during a mid-term election year, Arizona suffers in 
capacities not simply limited to political debate and legal battles. The state of Arizona incurs 
significant economic repercussions because of SB1070. For instance, regarding tourism, 
Arizona, by signing its immigration policy into law, initiated a, “fierce national backlash against 
the state,” which led many prominent figures, “national organizations and opinion leaders to call 
for economic boycotts”109. Due to major groups and organizations cancelling conventions and 
                                                 
107 Price, Susan p1,2 
State members of the group consists of a mixture of northern and southern states: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and West 
Virginia 
108 Ibid 107 p2 
The goal of this group is to reduce or eliminate the possibility of illegal immigrants from receiving any 
form of “public benefits, welfare, education and employment opportunities.” 
109 Hudson, David. Center for American Progress “The Top 5 Reasons Why S.B. 1070—and Laws Like 
It—Cause Economic Harm: Arizona’s Anti-Immigration Law Has Significant Economic Consequences 
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associations with the state due to the stringent immigration law, Arizona faced an estimated 
“$141 million in conference losses [alone]… in the first year after passing SB1070”110. 
Additional loss was felt regarding the overall tourism industry in the first year after passing 
SB1070111. Furthermore, the state does not face only immediate economic, but also future and 
educational consequences112. As many legal Latino and foreign born students attend Arizona 
schools, they, as expressed by Arizona’s Maricopa Community College Chancellor Rufus 
Glasper, may face, “the offensive and discriminatory prospect of incessant demands to show 
their documents…we can expect…some will find this…discouraging and will discontinue their 
pursuit of education [in Arizona]”113. Because of this, a number of students are transferring and 
moving from the state. In addition to the diminishing student population, other persons and 
families in Arizona are also looking to leave the state, lowering the overall student and 
workforce population, further hurting the state’s economy114. 
SB1070 style laws also are established as economically destructive by a recent CATO 
report. This report states that SB1070 is, “economically destructive and inimical to growth,” as 
the law forces illegal, and some legal, residents to flee the state, taking their business, resources 
                                                                                                                                                             
for the Nation” 25 June 2012. 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2012/06/25/11677/the-top-5-reasons-why-s-b-
1070-and-laws-like-it-cause-economic-harm/  
110 Ibid 109 
111 Ibid 109 
“The impact on Arizona’s tourism industry in the first year after S.B. 1070 went on the books included 
the loss of an estimated $253 million in economic output, $9.4 million in tax revenues, and 2,761 jobs.” 
112 Ibid 109 
Because of the controversial nature of the law, many out-of-state students and persons residing within the 
state are looking elsewhere other than Arizona for tertiary education, so as not to be associated with the 
law. “Higher-education leaders in Arizona have said that their colleges and universities have already lost 
students, including out-of-state honors students, who don’t want to be subject to the racial profiling law.” 
113 Ibid 109 
114 Ibid 109 
“Citizens and lawful residents who are part of mixed-status families (families with some undocumented 
immigrants and some legal or citizen members) or who simply don’t want to undergo the scrutiny 
mandated under the new law are also leaving Arizona, further hurting the state’s economy.” 
 37 
and income elsewhere115. These real world implications and economic losses caused by SB1070 
mirror those of a Center for American Progress 2011 study, which estimated that if SB1070 were 
entered into full force without any judicial injunctions it would register a significant economic 
consequence to an already struggling state economy116. In short, the, “economic dislocation 
envisioned by S.B. 1070-type policies,” in addition to the legal costs of defending SB1070 in 
court, “runs directly counter to the interests of our nation as we continue to struggle to distance 
ourselves from the ravages of the Great Recession,”117. 
Despite evidence showing a decrease in the Hispanic and illegal immigrant population in 
Arizona, SB1070 does not represent the sole reason for this action118. Furthermore, with 
SCOTUS’ ruling as well as discovered constitutional concerns worthy of federal preemption 
regarding all the controversial sections of SB1070, in addition to international and state level 
                                                 
115 Ewing, Walter. Immigration Impact “Arizona’s Immigration Policies are an Economic Disaster” 27 
September 2012. http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/09/27/arizonas-immigration-policies-are-an-
economic-disaster/  
“According to the CATO report, ‘Arizona-style laws are economically destructive and inimical to 
growth.’ That is because ‘the unauthorized immigrants who left the state took their businesses, money, 
and spending power with them, which reduced demand for the goods and services that unauthorized 
immigrants purchased in the state.’ Moreover, ‘Arizona’s immigration laws drove thousands of renters 
and homeowners from the state, putting downward pressure on residential real-estate prices in the midst 
of a housing price collapse.’” 
116 Ibid 115 
The study conducted by the Center for American Progress “estimated that if SB 1070 were successful in 
its objective of removing all unauthorized immigrants from the state, Arizona would lose $29.5 billion in 
labor income, $4.2 billion in tax revenues, and 581,000 jobs. Why? Because “when undocumented 
workers are taken out of the economy, the jobs they support through their labor, consumption, and tax 
payments disappear as well’”. 
117 Ibid 115 
118 O’Dowd, Peter. Fronteras Desk, AZPM NPR PBS. “SB1070: Political Win, Economic Loss?” 26 June 
2012. https://www.azpm.org/p/top-news/2012/6/26/13726-sb-1070-political-win-economic-loss/  
Though sources cannot agree on a specific number of unauthorized workers who have left the state, it is 
determined that a significant number have left Arizona, whether to return to other states or their country 
of origin. SB1070 does not represent the sole reason for this movement of persons, though. “Since 2009, 
it’s estimated that as many as 200,000 illegal immigrants left Arizona on their own. Economists and 
others have said it was a combination of the state’s weak job market, the political climate and other 
factors that spurred that departure.” 
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economic ramifications and consequences caused by this law, SB1070 must be completely 
preempted and removed from statute. 
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3.0  SECOND CHAPTER – CASE STUDY: FRANCE V EUROPEAN UNION 
3.1 FIRST SECTION: BACKGROUND OF FRENCH DEPORTATION OF ROMA 
The EU, similar to the US federal government, is a centralized political and economic actor with 
numerous member-states that, through ratified treaties and centralized legislation, established 
delineations of power and jurisdiction. Dissimilar to the defined roles of government and judicial 
precedent in the US, the EU lacks structure, political supremacy and specific judicial precedent 
regarding the issue of immigration policy. 
Instead of establishing its central authority within a codified document, such as the US 
Constitution, the EU bases its current political and economic structure and delineation of powers 
within a myriad of ratified treaties, directives and agreements119. Despite creating an intricate 
and strong, centralized monetary union with a single market and currency zone, these treaties 
linked the member-states of the EU in a weak, loosely defined political authority120. European 
countries continue to disagree over whether to establish a solely intergovernmental or more 
federal political system. Due to this lack of cohesion or centralization of authority, immigration 
policy’s jurisdiction within the European system is difficult to delineate. Additionally, analyzing 
                                                 
119 Borragán, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano & Cini, Michelle. European Union Politics. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. Print. p33 
For example, the Treaty establishing the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (Maastrich 1993, Amsterdam 1997, Lisbon 2009) 
120 Ibid 119 p33-46 
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the EU’s supremacy represents a more arduous process than the US’s system. Because of a lack 
of single authority, the European model allows for member-state-level implementation of EU 
policy, resulting in potentially different interpretations. 
The EU, due to its lack of complete political jurisdiction over immigration policy, also 
faces an immigration controversy. The Sarkozy-led UMP (Conservatives) French government, 
during the summer of 2010, initiated a program to deport immigrants due to their lack of finding 
employment after a 3-month minimum residency121. This action, initially thought 
uncontroversial and abiding by EU law, quickly exploded as a French government circular 
indicated the closing of 300 immigrant camps and expulsion of over 1,000 immigrants targeted 
one specific group: ROMA122. The French government’s action, “a… breach of the EU ban on 
ethnic discrimination,” resulted in the European Commission’s desire to, “launch infringement 
proceedings, meaning that France could be hauled before the European Court of Justice”123. 
Regardless of the EU’s unfinished political structure, the Commission, the executive 
political actor of the EU, “is charged with upholding European law,” granting the Commission 
significant power and influence over member-states’ governments and policies124. The 
Commission, in its oversight capacity, discovered France’s immigration initiative in the wrong 
on two major accounts: firstly, it “was breaking a 2004 law enshrining freedom of movement 
across the EU” as ROMA, from Romania and Bulgaria, are EU citizens; and secondly, that, “the 
EU's charter of fundamental rights outlaws discrimination on ethnic grounds”125. 
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Despite the issue’s extensive debate, the controversial French policy remains in effect126. 
France, similar to Arizona with SB1070, enacted a governmental policy contrary to the will of, 
and delineated powers bestowed upon, its larger, centralized political authority, violating 
agreements and treaties it signed as a member-state of the EU. 
The issue of the French Romani Repatriation policy stems from an earlier problem, one 
present before the governmental circular of 2010. France, similar to a myriad of European 
nations, actively deported ROMA prior to 2010 without much EU or international resistance; in 
fact, the French government, in 2009, deported nearly 10,000 ROMA127. But who are the ROMA 
and why is this specific group of persons being actively targeted? 
The ROMA, a nomadic people originating from India, currently reside and travel 
throughout Europe128. In fact, ROMA are believed to represent, “the largest minority in Europe,” 
with estimates of their continental population ranging between 7 and 12 million, as there is no 
precise demographic data available129. Moreover, the generic term ROMA is utilized to classify 
peoples who, “[describe] themselves as Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Manouches, and Sinti”130. 
Though the classifications Gypsy and ROMA are commonly used and interchangeable terms, 
both terms originate from mistaken assumptions regarding their origin or limited description 
capacity; for example, the term, “Gypsy originated from the mistaken assumption that Gypsies 
                                                 
126 Ibid 3 
127 BBC, “Q&A: France Roma expulsions” 19 October 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
11027288  
“In fact, France has closed down illegal Roma camps and sent their inhabitants home for years. Last year 
10,000 Roma were sent back to Romania and Bulgaria, the government says.” 
128 Ibid 127 
“The Roma are a nomadic people whose ancestors are thought to have left north-west India at the 
beginning of the 11th Century and scattered across Europe.” 
129 Uzunova, Iskra. Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 27, No. 1  “Roma 
integration in Europe: Why minority rights are failing” 2010. http://academos.ro/sites/default/files/biblio-
docs/845/roma_integration_in_europe.pdf  p288 
130 Ibid 129 p287 
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came from Egypt,” and, “the term Roma is similarly misdirecting to the extent it suggests 
Romanian origins”131. Despite ROMA being a common descriptor, the term is used to describe 
persons belonging to both, “nomadic and non-nomadic communities—diverse in respect to 
language, religion, nationality, history, and culture—but understood to share a common 
ethnicity”132. 
The continued persecution or removal of ROMA from European societies represents the 
social tension towards ROMA integration. Due to their culture and livelihood, the ROMA refuse 
to assimilate into other cultural identities, such as the French identity. The historic and cultural 
differences between the ROMA and others in addition to the continued social tension forms the, 
“mistrust between Roma and non-Roma,” adding to the contemporary episode. This chapter, in 
its legal analysis and contextual political section, will address this social tension further and 
better address how and why the ROMA are targeted and why other Europeans do not want them 
residing in their societies. 
France, despite not retaining one of Europe’s largest concentration of ROMA, possesses a 
current estimate population between 400,000 and 500,000 ROMA, most being members of long-
established communities; additionally, according to the, “French Roma rights umbrella group 
FNASA…about 12,000 ROMA from Romania and Bulgaria,” also currently reside in France133. 
These persons, unlike the aforementioned 400,000 to 500,000, are believed to live within 
unauthorized camps outside urban centers, or to have entered France illegally134. Though ROMA 
from Romania and Bulgaria are EU citizens and possess the rights of citizenship entitled to them 
– via the Treaty on the EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 2004 Directive on the Rights of 
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Movement for EU citizens – citizens from both Romania and Bulgaria must acquire residency 
permits to reside within France after a three month period without finding employment135. This 
is the case because though Romania and Bulgaria are currently member-states of the EU, neither 
are integrated members within the Schengen Area. Because of this, special provisions can be 
enforced upon these states for a limited duration, as the aforementioned added immigration 
standards, minimizing the potential influx of Romanians and Bulgarians into France. As many 
ROMA fail to acquire such residency permits or employment after three months, the French 
government, with the suspicion of many ROMA residing in the country illegally, took action to 
deport ROMA. 
In order to better analyze this deportation policy, this chapter will classify immigration 
policy’s jurisdiction within Europe by examining treaties and legal precedent that established the 
EU. Section 2 of this chapter will analyze treaties regarding human rights, the free movement of 
EU citizens, and the founding and functioning of the EU, as well as EU legal precedent. The goal 
of this section is to determine whether the EU retains legal authority and supremacy over 
member-states regarding immigration policy, similar to the US case study, or if the EU even 
possesses the capability to install and enforce centralized immigration policy. Additionally, 
Section 2 will establish the rights of citizens of the EU regarding immigration and movement 
within the EU member-states’ territories. Section 3 will focus on the 2010 French government 
circular and the significance of the French government’s action towards ROMA and determine 
                                                 
135 Ibid 127 
As Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU during 2007, their citizens retain, “the right to enter France 
without a visa, but under special rules they must have work or residency permits if they wish to stay 
longer than three months. These are hard to come by, and most Roma from the two countries are thought 
to be in France illegally. Nine other EU states also have restrictions in place, typically requiring work 
permits. From January 2014, or seven years after the two countries' accession, Romanians and Bulgarians 
will enjoy full freedom of movement anywhere in the EU.” 
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the legality of the governmental initiative. Furthermore, Section 3 will examine why France took 
action against the ROMA, targeting them as a group despite their protected ethnic minority 
status. 
3.2 SECOND SECTION: EUROPEAN UNION STRUCTURE AND PRECEDENT – 
WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER IMMIGRATION?  
Similar to the US Constitution, the legal founding documents and treaties of the EU do not 
express with clear and active intent which level or component, if any, of European-level 
government retains jurisdiction over immigration policy. In order to establish the rights and 
jurisdiction of EU citizens and immigration policy, the founding documents of the European 
Union and Community, as well as the treaties establishing the rights of EU citizens, must be 
examined. 
Many European nations, after ratifying the founding charter of the UN, also signed the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – what later 
developed into the Charter on Fundamental Freedoms, the EU’s equivalent of the US’ Bill of 
Rights136. This ratified treaty, which France signed, declares and outlines the rights of its 
member-states’ citizens. As granted by the Convention’s Article 5, every person is granted the 
right to liberty and security of one’s self except in certain circumstances such as regarding 
                                                 
136 Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 4.XI.1950 p5 
‘Governments’ members of Council of Europe, following the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, on the 10th of December 1948, aim to secure recognition and observance of human rights by 
maintaining and furthering realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms in order to establish a 
greater unity between members. The reaffirmation of fundamental freedoms will represent the foundation 
of justice and peace globally and will be best maintained by effective political democracy and by a 
common understanding and observance of humans rights for which they depend.’ 
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unauthorized entry into a signing member-state’s territory137. The Convention also states, in 
Article 14, that the, “enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention will be 
secured without discrimination on any grounds,” preventing specific groups of persons being 
targeted by national governments, as conducted by the former Nationalist Socialist Party of 
Germany138. Similarly, Article 17 of the Convention protects the rights and freedoms of citizens 
of the High Contracting Parties (HCP), the countries, signing members, of the Convention, from 
being altered or diminished139. These rights aforementioned are further protected by Protocol 12 
to the Convention, ensuring the, “enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground,” to a list more substantial than the original Convention’s 
Article 5140. 
Prior to the signing of the Treaty of the EU or the Schengen acquis, the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms established a basic form of freedom 
                                                 
137 Ibid 136 p8 
Article 5 (F): “Lawful arrest and detention of person to prevent… unauthorized entry into country or of 
person against whom action is taken with view to deport or extradite” 
138 Ibid 136 p13 
Article 14: Prohibition of Discrimination states that no person or group of persons can be discriminated 
against on grounds of the following provisions: “sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. 
Though this list develops over the course of the European Community’s political evolution, this initial list 
makes it illegal to discriminate against minorities or specific groups of persons because of their identity. 
139 Ibid 136 p14 
Article 17: Prohibition of Abuse of Rights, states that “nothing in the Convention implies any State, group 
or person any right to engage in activity or to perform acts aimed at the destruction of any rights or 
freedoms set forth”. This article establishes that no state actor or group of persons within a state can, with 
legal authority of this Convention, actively harass or hinder the rights of others. 
140 Ibid 136 p 52 
“Protocol No.12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with 
regards to Equal Protection of the Law 
Article 1: General Prohibition of Discrimination 
The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such 
as: sex, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with 
national minority, property and birth or other status. None shall be discriminated against by any public 
authority on any ground as those [previously listed].” 
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of movement for the HCPs’ citizens. Article 2 of the fourth protocol to the Convention allowed 
all lawful citizens of HCPs to travel within the territory of each state141; additionally, Article 4 of 
the fourth protocol further protected this right by making it illegal to collectively expulse 
aliens142. Though Article 2 protects a lawful citizen’s right to freedom of movement and 
residency within the territory of an HCP, it does so with specific limitation. This article 
expresses the limits of citizens’ rights, in that they can be restricted, “in accordance with the law 
and necessary in democratic society in interests of national security or public safety, for 
maintenance of ordre public”143. This ability for states to determine when the rights of its 
citizens are in conflict with its security or laws is demonstrative of the greater issue involving 
immigration policy’s jurisdiction within the modern EU. In addition, these two articles appear to 
lay the foundation for the treaty of the EU and the rights of the EU’s member-states within the 
Schengen acquis. 
Before examining the treaty that established the EU, the treaty of Maastricht, the 
agreement allowing the freedom of movement of citizens within the greater aligned European 
Community – the Schengen Agreement (acquis) – must be investigated. The Schengen acquis, 
signed initially in 1985, abolished checks at common borders on, “movement of persons and [to 
help] facilitate the transport and movement of goods at borders”; in fact, this treaty established 
                                                 
141 Ibid 136 p38 
In Protocol Number 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Article 2 (Freedom of Movement) states: 
“1) Everyone lawfully within territory of state shall, within territory, have right to liberty of movement 
and freedom to choose residence 
2) Everyone Shall be free to leave any country 
3) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than in accordance with the law and 
necessary in democratic society in interests of national security or public safety, for maintenance of ordre 
public”. 
142 Ibid 136 
143 Ibid 140 
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the European Community – the political entity prior to the EU – with an internal market that 
comprised of no internal frontiers, allowing the free movement of persons and goods within the 
signatories’ territories144. Additionally, the agreement establishes legal definitions for specific 
movements of persons as well as outlines the manner aliens can travel within the territory of the 
Contracting Parties. The acquis also describes how to apply for residence visas within the host 
Contracting Parties145. 
Importantly, the Schengen acquis outlines the process by which long-stay visas, for stays 
exceeding three months, are assigned. In Section 2, Article 18, long-stay visas are, “national 
visas issued by the Contracting Party according to…national law,” implying a potential variance 
of standards and requirements to acquire and maintain a long-stay visa dependent on the 
member-state146. Though this article outlines the requirements of the movement of aliens within 
the Contracting Parties’ territories, these standards do not carry significant importance as the 
targeted people for the purposes of this paper, the ROMA, are citizens of EU member-states147. 
Despite this agreement representing the first draft of a Free Movement Treaty between member-
states of the European Communities, Article 61 outlines the manner by which the French 
                                                 
144 The Schengen Agreement, 14 June 1985. P1 
The Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed this agreement; furthermore, these signatory 
states were known as the “Contracting Parties”. The Single European Act, giving it legal authority within 
the European Community, supplemented this agreement. 
“Article 1 Definitions: Internal Borders – common land borders of Contracting Parties, airports and 
internal flights, sea ports for regular ferry connections exclusively from or to other ports within territories. 
External Borders: Contracting Parties’ land and sea borders, airports and sea ports 
Alien: Any person other than a national of a Member State of European communities.” 
145 Ibid 144 
146 Ibid 144 p6 
147 Ibid 144 p6 
“Chapter 4 Article 19: Aliens who hold uniform visas and who are legally entered into the territory of a 
Contracting Party may move freely within the territories of Contracting Parties during valid visa period. 
Article 22: Aliens who legally entered the territory of a Contracting Party [are] obliged to report to 
competent Contracting Party authorities upon entry or within three working days of entry.” 
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Republic undertakes extradition of persons148. Also, as Romania and Bulgaria remain outside the 
Schengen area, their citizens, in France, remain subjects to additional restrictions on the freedom 
of movement and residency. 
The rights and freedoms of EU member-state citizens were later updated by a 2004 
Directive of the European Parliament and Council to better represent the EU’s understanding of 
the “right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member-states”149. By modernizing the rights and abilities of EU member-state 
citizens to travel and reside within the territory of other member-states, this directive outlines the 
limited capacity of residency within a host member-state without being subject to specific 
conditions150. Even though EU citizenship bestows all citizens with the right to, “move and 
reside freely within territory of member-states,” this freedom is limited to, “residence in host 
member-state for [a] period not exceeding three months;” beyond this duration, EU citizens 
would become, “subject to conditions or [additional] formalities,” in order to maintain their 
residence in the host member-state151. 
                                                 
148 Ibid 144 p 21 
Article 61: “The French Republic undertakes extradition for persons, after proceeding brought for acts 
punishable under French law by penalty depriving person(s) of liberty or detention order of a maximum 
two year period and under law of requesting Contracting Party by penalty of depriving liberty or detention 
order of maximum one year”. 
149 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council – 29 April 2004. p77 
150 Ibid 149 p 78,79 
“1) Citizenship of Union confers on all citizens of Union a primary and individual right to move and 
reside freely within territory of member-states, subject to limitations and conditions laid down in Treaty 
(of the EU) and to measures adopted to give it effect. 
2) Free movement of persons constitutes one of fundamental freedoms of internal market – [an] area 
without internal frontiers 
3) Union citizenship should be fundamental status of nationals of member-states: when they exercise their 
right of free movement and residence 
5) Right of all Union citizens to move and reside freely within territory of member-states should, if 
exercised under objective conditions of freedom and dignity, also be granted to family members, 
irrespective of nationality.” 
151 Ibid 149 p80 
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The paramount condition EU citizens abide by in order to maintain residence exceeding a 
three-month period within a host member-state is to not become an unreasonable burden upon 
the state152. As established by the leading political authorities of the EU, the right of residence 
for EU citizens for periods longer than three months, “should be subject to conditions”153. Such 
conditions entail registering with specific authorities in the new place of residence, residence 
cards, being employed or seeking employment within the host member-state and the need to not 
become unreasonable burdens upon the social system of the host member-state154. If persons fail 
to abide by these conditions, they could be expelled155. 
                                                                                                                                                             
“9) Union citizens should have the right of residence in host member-state for period not exceeding three 
months without being subject to conditions or formalities other than requirement to hold a valid 
identification card or passport, without prejudice to more favourable treatment applicable to job-seekers 
as recognized by case-law of the European Court of Justice”. 
152 Ibid 149 p81 
“10) Persons exercising right of residence should not become an unreasonable burden on social assistance 
system of host member-state during initial period of residence. The right of residence for Union citizens 
and family members for periods in excess of three months should be subject to conditions.” 
153 Ibid 152 
154 Ibid 149 p93,94 
“Article 7: Right of residence for more than 3 months 
1) All Union citizens have right of residence on territory of another member-state for a period longer than 
three months if: a) are workers or self-employed persons in host member-state, b) have sufficient 
resources for themselves and family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of 
host member-state and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in host member-state, c) are enrolled 
at a private or public establishment for principal purpose of following a course of study, d) family 
members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who satisfies conditions referred to in points (a), (b) or 
(c). 
3) Union citizen who no longer is a worker or self-employed person can retain the status of worker or 
self-employed person in the following conditions: a) Is temporarily unable to work as a result of illness or 
accident, b) is in duly recorded involuntary employment after been employed for more than a year and 
registered as a job-seeker with relevant employment office, c) is in duly recorded involuntary 
unemployment after completing a fixed-term employment contract less than a year after having become 
involuntary unemployed during first twelve months and registered with a relevant employment office – 
status of worker shall be retained for no less than six months. 
155 Ibid 149 p 81,82 
“12) For periods of residence longer than three months, member-states should have the possibility to 
require Union citizens to register with competent authorities in place of residence – attested by 
registration certificate. 
16) As long as beneficiaries of the right of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on the social 
assistance system of the host member-state, they should not be expelled. An expulsion measure should 
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Though EU citizens could be deported from a host member-state’s territory, “on grounds 
of public policy, public security and public health,” the 2004 Directive expands upon the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom’s list of protected 
groups from discrimination156. As the, “Directive respects fundamental rights and freedoms and 
observes the Charter,” the Directive includes groups such as “membership of ethnic minority,” as 
opposed to simply registered national minority, as a protected class against which a member-
state cannot explicitly target or discriminatorily expel157. It is interesting to note that as the 
collective European community expanded and developed into the EU, the registered groups of 
protected persons, against which discrimination is prohibited, also expanded. 
In addition to the expanded list of protected persons, the 2004 Directive also ensures that 
EU citizens cannot be expelled from a host-member state as long as they meet specific 
requirements158. As long as said citizens and their families can prove they are employed or 
actively seeking employment, they cannot be expelled from a host member-state. This provision, 
in conjunction with the expanded list of protected persons, applies to the Romanian and 
                                                                                                                                                             
not be an automatic consequence of recourse to social assistance system. In no case should expulsion 
measures be adopted against workers, self-employed persons or job-seekers defined by the European 
Court of Justice on grounds of public policy or security.”  
156 Ibid 149 p87 
157 Ibid 149 p86 
31) The Directive respects the rights and privileges bestowed upon member-state citizens within the 
Charter for Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms whilst expanding the protected groups 
against which discrimination cannot be implemented. 
“In accordance with prohibition of discrimination contained in the Charter, member-states’ must 
implement the Directive without discrimination between beneficiaries of the Directive on grounds of: sex, 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other 
opinion, membership of ethnic minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
158 Ibid 149 p104 
The specific requirements above state that the, “expulsion may in no case be adopted against Union 
citizens and family if: a) Union citizens are workers or self-employed persons, b) Union citizens entered 
territory of host member-state to seek employment – Union citizens and family may not be expelled as 
long as EU citizen can provide evidence they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a 
genuine chance of being engaged.” 
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Bulgarian ROMA as they are citizens of EU member-states and are classified as a group 
protected from discrimination. Thus, according to the 2004 Directive and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the ROMA cannot be discriminated 
against as a group and cannot be expelled as long as they, after residing in a host member-state 
for longer than three months, provide evidence of employment or seeking employment. 
With the freedoms and privileges of EU citizens recognized, the founding treaties 
establishing the EU and the functioning of the EU must be examined to determine the 
jurisdiction of immigration policy in Europe and whether these aforementioned rights are 
protected and ensured by the central authority of the EU over member-state sovereignty. Though 
this paper will examine the current treaty establishing the EU and the functioning of the EU, the 
revised 2009 Lisbon Treaty, this paper will first analyze the original treaty establishing the EU, 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and its amending treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, in 
order to understand the evolving nature of the EU’s political entity, structure and powers. 
The Maastricht Treaty, titled, “Provisions amending the treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC) with a view to establishing the European Community (EC),” is 
recognized as the first founding document of the EU159. This treaty established an internal 
market with complete freedom of movement for goods, persons, services and capital, and 
established the, “approximation of laws of member-states to the extent required for the 
functioning of the common market”160. Though this demonstrates the greater significance of the 
economic aspect of the EC, this nevertheless initiates a unification of political policies across all 
                                                 
159 The Maastricth Treaty: Provisions amending the treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community with a view to establishing the European Community, Maastricht 7 February 1992 
160 Ibid 159 p2,3 
“Article 3: c) internal market with abolition, between member-states, of obstacles to free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital, h) approximation of laws of member-states to extent required for 
functioning of the common market” 
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member-states, ensuring some protection and enforcement of EU policies and standards. In fact, 
at the establishment of the EC, or EU, the emphasis of political authority was granted to the 
member-states as the, “Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
the Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein”161. Contradictory to the centralized federal 
government in the US, Europe’s inclusion of limited power, authority and significance in 
political power indicates the intergovernmental nature of the EC and the member-states’ desire to 
retain political sovereignty in many policy areas162. By stressing the EC’s limited capacity and 
its ability to act, referred to as its, “principle of subsidiarity” to the authority of the member-
states, the EC was originally intended to be a weak central authority, lacking the enforceability 
of the American executive’s bureaucracy. 
Building upon a strong economically based treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam amends 
Maastricht and introduces more political amendments to the EU’s structure163. In 1997, this 
treaty codified the principles upon which the EU is founded, “The Union is founded on 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
rule of law”164. As stated to be common elements held by all member-states, these principles 
establish the EU’s desire to, “respect the national identities of its member-states,” and ensure the 
                                                 
161 Ibid 159 p3 
162 Ibid 159 p3,4 
Further outlining the restrictions of the political powers and jurisdiction of the EC, the Treaty states in 
Article 3b that, “In areas which do not fall within the Treaty’s exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by a member-state and can therefore be better achieved 
by the community.” 
163 Treaty of Amsterdam: Amending the Treaty on the European Union, the treaties establishing the 
European Community and certain related acts. 1997 
164 Ibid 163 p8 
“Article F, paragraph 1: The Union is founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to member-states.” 
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maintenance and development of the Union in regards to the freedom, security and justice of its 
collective citizenry, including ethnic minorities such as the ROMA165.  
Again, adding upon the weak political powers of the Treaty of Maastricht, Amsterdam 
expands the authority and oversight powers of the political entities of the EU over its member-
states. Opposed to simply working in a subsidiary role, the EU’s Commission (the equivalent of 
the American federal executive branch), Parliament and Council of Ministers (the equivalent of 
the American federal legislative branch) acquired greater powers to enforce EU policies, treaties 
and legislation with an ability to suspend certain rights of, or enact punitive measures upon, its 
member-states166. In fact, this treaty grants the EU’s political entities the ability to take action 
against any member-state in order to combat, “discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”167. Thus, despite the continued 
subsidiary nature of the EU in regards to member-states’ sovereignty and the limited jurisdiction 
of the Council, this treaty grants the EU the ability to, within limited, structured powers, combat 
any form of discrimination meeting the aforementioned criteria. This ability allows the EU to 
better protect its founding principles and prevent discrimination. 
                                                 
165 Ibid 163 p8 
“5. Article B: To maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the 
free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with the appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.” 
166 Ibid 163 p9 
For example, the Council is granted the ability to suspend certain rights and privileges of specific 
member-states that are determined to violate specific EU principles: 
“Article F.1: The Council by unanimity on proposal by one third of the member-states or the Commission 
may determine the existence of serious and persistent breach(es) by a member-state… The Council, with 
a qualified majority, can suspend certain rights deriving from the Treaty to [the specific] member-state. 
[Despite any action of this kind taken upon a specific member-state] the member-state’s obligations under 
this treaty will continue to be binding.” 
167 Ibid 163 p26 
“Article 6a: Without prejudice to the rest of the Treaty and within the limits of powers conferred by the 
Treaty upon the Community, the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
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  The Amsterdam Treaty continued to add to the EU’s political entity by officially 
incorporating the Schengen acquis into the foundation of the EU. In an annexed protocol to the 
Treaty on the EU, the, “Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the EU’s framework,” 
established the standards, rights and privileges of the original agreement being integrated as a 
component of the EU168. Moreover, the acquis is made a fundamental element of the admissions 
process of new member-states into the EU, expanding upon the “gradual abolition of checks at 
common borders,” in order to “enhance European integration and enable the EU to develop more 
rapidly into an area of freedom, security and justice”169170. However, as aforementioned, 
Romania and Bulgaria, despite their entrance into the EU, remain outside the Schengen area. 
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, the current treaty establishing the EU and the functioning 
of the EU, further centralizes and delineates power to the EU171. Expanding upon the previous 
two treaties, Lisbon furthers the EU’s initiative by declaring that the: 
“EU shall uphold and promote its values and interests, contribute to peace… 
mutual respect among peoples, the protection of human rights… strict observance 
and development of international law, including…principles of… UN Charter”172. 
 
Declaring such determination to promote international law and human rights within and external 
of its borders, the EU’s commitment to treat all persons of different backgrounds equally 
demonstrates its evolution and continued its importance of non-discrimination. Though this 
                                                 
168 Ibid 163 p93 
“Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the EU’s framework: Pertains to all High Contracting 
Parties… agreements on gradual abolition of checks at common borders on 14 June 1985 and 19 June 
1990… with the aim at enhancing European integration and enable the European Union to develop more 
rapidly into an area of freedom, security and justice.” 
169 Ibid 163 p96 
“Article 8: For admission of new member-states into the EU, the Schengen acquis and further measures 
taken by the institutions within its scope shall and must be accepted in full by all States candidates for 
admission.” 
170 Ibid 168 
171 Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community 2009 
172 Ibid 171 p11 
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treaty recognizes the, “EU and member-states shall assist each other in carrying out tasks that 
flow from the treaties,” the EU remains in a subsidiary position in that, “competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the member-states”173. Because of this 
continued subsidiary role in areas not expressively delineated to the EU, the jurisdiction of 
issues, such as immigration policy, remain vague. 
Regardless of the EU’s subsidiary role in policy areas that are not expressed as exclusive 
competences, the Lisbon Treaty establishes the, “rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (7 December 2000, 12 December 2007),” as possessing the same 
legal value as the Treaties174. This inclusion, in addition to acceding the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and stressing that the, “EU shall 
observe [in all activities] the principle of equality of citizens, who shall receive equal attention 
from [all components of the EU]”, again stresses the EU’s desire to maintain and defend human 
rights and protect all its citizens175176. 
The Treaty of Lisbon further delineates the powers granted to the political institutions of 
the EU. The Commission retains the ability to, “ensure application of Treaties and measures 
adopted by the institutions pursuant to them,” as well as, “oversee the application of Union law 
                                                 
173 Ibid 171 p12 
Article 3a and Article 3b 
174 Ibid 171 p13 
“Article 6: 1) The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (7 December 2000, 12 December 2007).” 
175 Ibid 171 p13 
“Article 6: 2) The European Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” 
176 Ibid 171 p14 
This article stresses that every national of a member-state is recognized as a full citizen of the EU, 
inheriting all the protections and equal representation such citizenship entails. “Article 8: In all activities, 
the European Union shall observe the principle of equality of citizens, who shall receive equal attention 
from institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.” 
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under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union”177. These powers, similar to 
those of the executive branch of the US federal government, grant the Commission the ability to 
enforce and regulate the treaties and all legislation or agreements that the treaties founding the 
EU recognize as carrying legal authority, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 
Schengen acquis and 2004 Directive. 
In addition to expressing the enumerated powers to the Commission, the Lisbon Treaty 
lists the categories and areas of the EU’s competence, establishing its exclusive and shared 
authority. As aforementioned, the EU, dissimilar to the US federal government, does not possess 
complete supremacy over its conglomeration of member-states. A result of incomplete 
centralized supremacy is that the EU can “legislate or adopt legally binding acts,” whenever the, 
“Treaties confer on the [EU] exclusive competence in specific areas”178. The limited areas of 
exclusive competence granted to the EU are: “Customs union; establishing competition rules of 
the internal market; monetary policy for the Eurozone; conservation of marine biological 
resources; Common Commercial Policy”179. None of these areas appear to relate to the 
jurisdiction of immigration policy. 
Concurrently, the list of shared competences between the EU and member-states’ 
governments is more extensive and contains policy areas that intersect immigration policy’s 
jurisdiction: “Internal Market; Social Policy; Economic, social and territorial cohesion… Area of 
freedom, security and justice”180. Despite requiring the EU to work in coordination with 
                                                 
177 Ibid 171 p19 
Article 9D – The Commission 
178 Ibid 171 p46 
Article 2A 
179 Ibid 171 p47 
Article 2B 
180 Ibid 171 p47 
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member-states regarding these areas of shared competence, the EU is allowed to, “take initiatives 
to ensure the coordination of member-states’ social policies,” such as their treatment of ethnic 
minorities and immigration policies181. Furthermore, the EU, regardless of an issue’s level of 
competence, aims to, “combat discrimination [in any member-state] based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”182. Because of this, the EU, 
with all its powers and influence, shall, “endeavour to ensure high level of security through 
measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia” throughout its member-states183. 
With such interest in protecting the rights of all persons and eliminating discrimination 
and xenophobia, the Treaty of Lisbon grants the European Parliament and the Council the power 
to adopt measures to establish a common immigration policy184. This policy, though, creates a 
set of guidelines for all member-states to use as a template to develop their individual national 
                                                                                                                                                             
Article 2C: “1) The Union shall share competence with the member-states where the Treaties confer. 2) 
Shared competences between the [EU] and the member-states: a) Internal Market, b) Social Policy, c) 
Economic, social and territorial cohesion, d) Agriculture and Fisheries, e) Environment, f) Consumer 
Protection, g) Transport, h) Trans-European Networks, i) Energy, j) Area of freedom, security and justice, 
k) Common safety concerns in public health matters.” 
181 Ibid 171 p48 
Article 2D 
182 Ibid 171 p49 
Article 5B 
183 Ibid 171 p58 
Article 61 
184 Ibid 171 p61,62 
“Article 63a 
1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient 
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in member-
states, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in 
human beings. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the following areas: a) the conditions of entry 
and residence, and standards on the issue by member-states of long-term visas and residence permits, 
including those for the purpose of family reunification; 
b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a member-state, including the 
conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other member-states; 
c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing 
without authorization.” 
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policies. Because of the aforementioned ability of the EU to intervene on issues of member-state 
social policy and prevent discrimination and xenophobia, member-states must not violate or 
contradict the common policy legislated by the EU. If member-states did so, the Commission 
could bring legal action against the member-state to the Court of Justice of the EU. 
The Lisbon Treaty also outlines the process by which the EU can bring legal action 
against member-states that fail to enact or abide by EU legislation and treaties. Member-states 
must adopt measures within their national law to implement legally binding EU laws and acts185. 
In cases of member-states not fulfilling their obligation to abide by EU law and the Treaties, the 
Commission can bring its grievances against a member-state before the Court of Justice of the 
EU186. Additionally, if the Commission believes a member-state violates a directive adopted 
under proper legislative procedure, it may enact a mandatory monetary fine upon the member-
state187. Furthermore, if the Court of Justice discovers the member-state to have created an 
“infringement” or violation of EU law, it too can impose an additional monetary penalty, not 
                                                 
185 Ibid 171 p114 
“Article 249C: 1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally 
binding Union acts. 
2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall 
confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases 
provided for in Articles 11 and 13 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council. 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of 
regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of 
implementing powers.” 
186 Ibid 171 p108 
“If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to 
comply with judgment of the Court, it may bring the case before the Court after giving that State the 
opportunity to submit its observations. It shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to 
be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
187 Ibid 171 p108 
“When the Commission brings a case before the Court pursuant to Article 226 on the grounds that the 
Member State concerned has failed to fulfill its obligation to notify measures transposing a directive 
adopted under a legislative procedure, it may, when it deems appropriate, specify the amount of the lump 
sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances.” 
 59 
exceeding the cost of the Commission’s, upon the member-state188. This ability of the Court of 
Justice to deliberate on the legality of EU legislation and law is granted by Article 7 of the Treaty 
on the EU189. Unlike the American federal model, the EU’s centralized legal and executive 
systems lack the extensive powers, resources and manpower of the American bureaucracy and 
judicial system. Without complete supreme authority, constitutional expressed delineation of 
powers to the judiciary, or the executive manpower to successfully enforce EU legislation and its 
treaties, the EU currently cannot hold member-states accountable via judicial measures beyond 
economic sanctions. 
Despite lacking a strong executive bureaucracy to enforce EU legislation and hold 
member-states accountable for their violations of EU standards and treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon 
does grant the EU a specific power similar to a US Constitutional power granted to the federal 
government: a supremacy clause. One of the final provisions written into the Treaty of Lisbon 
deals with the “Declaration concerning primacy”, in which it was established that: 
“In Accordance with settled case law of COJEU, the Treaties and the law adopted 
by the Union on basis of Treaties have primacy over the law of member-states, 
under conditions laid down by case law on the primacy of EC law set out in 
11197/07 (JUR 260). Quote from: Opinion of the Council Legal Service of 22 
June 2007”190. 
 
This clause, in regards to the implementation of statutes and treaties, ensures EU supremacy over 
member-state law. Though not officially written into the treaties, the EU’s supremacy is 
                                                 
188 Ibid 171 p108 
“If the Court finds that there is an infringement it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on the 
Member State concerned not exceeding the amount specified by the Commission. The payment obligation 
shall take effect on the date set by the Court in its judgment.” 
189 Ibid 171 p110 
“The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to decide on the legality of an act adopted by the European 
Council or by the Council pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
190 Ibid 171 p256 
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protected by European legal precedent, as decided by the Court of Justice, which ensures the 
EU’s ability to implement and regulate the Treaties and EU law. 
Three Court of Justice cases established the EU’s supremacy “clause”: Costa v Enel Case 
6/64; Administrazonie delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal S.P.A. Case 106/77; and 
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA Case C 106/89. These rulings 
interpreted articles of the EEC and EC founding treaties in regards to the European treaties 
conflicting with member-state laws. Though not founding as strong a political power as the US’ 
Plenary Power Doctrine, these three cases, starting with Costa v Enel, provide the basis for EU 
supremacy over member-state law, granting the EU’s political and judicial branches a significant 
authority. 
During the 1960’s, in the European Economic Community, the case of Costa v Enel 
ensured the legitimacy and supremacy of European level treaties and law over the sovereignty of 
the member-states. In 1964, the Court of Justice ruled that national courts must refer any cases 
pertinent to the interpretation of the Treaties to the Court of Justice191. The Court of Justice 
possesses supremacy and jurisdiction over matters of interpreting European level issues and 
matters of “interpretation of the Treaty,” because the, “EEC Treaty [as have subsequent EC and 
EU Treaties] created its own legal system which became an integral part of the legal systems of 
its member-states and which their courts are bound to apply”192. Instead of retaining complete 
control over all legal and political issues, the member-states, “by creating a community of 
unlimited duration, [with] its own institutions, personality, own legal capacity and capacity of 
                                                 
191  Costa v Enel 6/64 p592 
“By means of Article 177, national courts must refer matters to the Court of Justice so that a preliminary 
ruling may be given upon the ‘interpretation of the Treaty’ whenever a question of interpretation is raised 
before them.” 
192 Ibid 191 p593 
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representation on the international plane,” curtailed their jurisdiction over legal matters as the 
European political entity has, “real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a 
transfer of powers from the states to the community [as] the member-states have limited their 
sovereign rights”193. By creating a community with certain supreme powers over the limited-
sovereign states, the member-states of the European Community, “created a body of law which 
binds,” them all together under a single, centralized code of regulation194. Because of this, a 
uniform code of Community law is enforced and must be upheld by all member-states as, 
“executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to 
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty,” 
due to Article 5 of the Treaty and the active prevention of discrimination195. Furthermore, 
Community law’s precedence is confirmed by the Treaty’s Article 189, for Community 
provisions, “would be meaningless if a state could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a 
legislative [or judicial] measure which could prevail over Community law”196. Thus, it is from 
the need to fulfill the requirements of enforcing a common standard of implementing European 
legislation and law, as well as to ensure the suppression of discrimination, that a transference of 
authority and legitimacy from the member-states to the EEC, or today, the EU occurred197. 
Since the Costa ruling, the Court of Justice continued its definition of the “direct 
applicability” concept of Community law with its judgment regarding Administrazonie delle 
Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal S.P.A. and Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
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“Transfer by states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and 
obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against 
which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.” 
 62 
Alimentación SA198. Within these rulings, the Court of Justice defined Community law as, “a 
new legal order of international law,” the subjects of this law being the member-states and their 
nationals; additionally, Community law’s, “legal system…forms part of the legal system of 
member-states,” meaning all member-states must recognize and adhere to the authority of the 
Court of Justice as, “Community law is mandatory and absolute”199. In fact, national authorities 
and governments are forbidden from introducing legislation or national provisions that conflict 
with the Treaty or Community law200. Furthermore, national governments must, “take all 
appropriate steps to ensure Community law is given full force and effect,” preempting national 
laws and provisions as Community law, “must be accorded absolute precedence over domestic 
law”201. Thus, similar to the precedent establishing the US federal executive and legislative 
branches with supreme jurisdiction over immigration policy, these precedents establish 
Community law and the European Treaties as taking precedence over member-state law and 
sovereignty202203.  
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202Ibid 198 p643 
This is the case because Community law preempts national law of all member-states. “In accordance with 
the principle of precedence of Community law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and the 
directly applicable measures of the institutions and the naitnal law of the member-states is such that those 
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203 Ibid 198 p644 
The supremacy of Community law is again expressed in the Court of Justice’s ruling as, “Every national 
court must, in cases within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect the rights 
which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which 
may conflict with it, prior to or subsequent to Community rule.” 
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3.3 THIRD SECTION: FRENCH DEPORTATION POLICY CONTROVERSY AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 First subsection: Build-up to Controversy 
Despite being considered a model nation for human rights, France, with its 2010 repatriation 
policy, was only the latest actor to respond to an ongoing engagement with the ROMA ethnic 
group. The summer of 2010, in fact, did not even represent the first or most successful attempt at 
removing ROMA from France. Prior to the international controversy, France, in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively, deported about 8,500 and 10,000 ROMA; a majority of said persons leaving, 
according to the French government, left voluntarily with a government incentive package, 
called “welfare grants” of 300 euro per adult and 100 euro per child204205. The reason for the 
international backlash to a continued policy of removing persons from French borders who failed 
to achieve employment within a 3-month period was in response to a leaked memo from the 
French Interior Ministry. Though a legal analysis and presentation of this memo will be 
conducted, prior events in 2010 led to the development and deployment of this memo.  
France, similar to most member-states of the EU, placed restrictions upon the freedom of 
movement granted to Romanian and Bulgarian citizens upon their respective states’ admission 
                                                 
204 Fitchner, Ullrich. Spiegel online “Driving out the unwanted: Sarkozy’s war against the Roma” 15 
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205 Simons, Stefan. Spiegel online, “Sarkozy finds a scapegoat: France begins controversial Roma 
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government to resettle.” 
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into the EU on 1 January 2007206. With the ability to, “temporarily restrict the right of workers 
from Bulgaria and Romania under EU law on free movement to work,” France’s utilization of 
the transitional agreements of the free movement of workers from Romania and Bulgaria, 
demanding a work or residence permit for Romanians and Bulgarians wanting to reside in France 
for periods longer than three months, demonstrates France’s hesitancy towards allowing 
Romanians and Bulgarians in their society207. 
This hesitancy only worsened after the summer of 2010. On 16 July 2010, members of 
the French police fatally shot a French Romani man who attempted to flee a police 
checkpoint208. This event led to a violent retaliation, initiated by the group “Gens du voyage”, or 
‘French travelers’, in which numerous persons of French origin and ROMA attacked Saint-
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208 Ibid 127 
“In July, dozens of French Roma armed with hatchets and iron bars attacked a police station, hacked 
down trees and burned cars in the small Loire Valley town of Saint Aignan. The riot erupted after a 
gendarme shot and killed a French Roma, 22-year-old Luigi Duquenet, who officials said had driven 
through a police checkpoint, knocking over a policeman. Media reports suggested he had been involved 
in a burglary earlier that day. Duquenet's family dispute the police version of events, saying he was scared 
of being stopped because he did not have a valid driver's licence.” 
 65 
Aignan209. Saint-Aignan’s mayor described the attack as, “a settling of scores between the 
travellers and the gendarmerie (French police)”210. The violence expanded in Grenoble as riots 
also developed in protest of the killing of 22 year old Luigi Duquenet at the police checkpoint, 
leading to more persons shooting at and being shot by members of the French police; claiming 
they acted in self-defense, members of the French police returned fire and killed 27 year old 
French resident, Mr. Karim Boudouda211.  
These acts of violence led to, “a government spokesman call[ing] Gypsies ‘sources of 
illegal trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of children for 
begging, of prostitution and crime [within France]’”212. In addition to this strong opinion, 
President Nicolas Sarkozy announced, on 28 July, that ROMA camps were to be dismantled and 
their inhabitants, “systematically evacuated”213. Furthermore, two days later, the French 
President, in response to the recent security concerns, publicly announced his position on the 
violent acts and the ROMA at Grenoble. President Sarkozy denounced the violent 
demonstrations against the police, stating the criminals actively endangered the lives of law 
                                                 
209 BBC. “Troops patrol French village of Saint-Aignan after riot” 19 July 2010. 
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“In separate rioting at the weekend, youths clashed with police in the Alpine city of Grenoble. Four men 
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in the suburb of Villeneuve. The rioting was triggered by the death of 27-year-old Karim Boudouda, who 
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212 Suddath, Claire. TIME World, “Who are Gypsies, and Why Is France Deporting Them?” 26 August 
2010. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2013917,00.html  
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enforcement officers as well as the security of the surrounding communities214. In order to better 
minimize the potential of further violent demonstrations, President Sarkozy stated he asked the 
Minister of the Interior to, "put an end to the wild squatting and camping of the Roma"215.  
In order to better defend the security of the nation, President Sarkozy also stated he 
would not accept the presence an estimated 539 illegal Romani camps in France, promising the 
citizenry that half of the camps would be closed within three months216. Despite the French 
government having already deported almost 20,000 ROMA over the previous two years prior to 
July 2010, this specific targeting of the unauthorized ROMA camps as, “sources of illegal 
trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of children for begging, of 
prostitution and crime,” became the source of international attention217. 
By the end of August 2010, the Sarkozy government closed 51 ROMA camps and 
deported at least 1,230 non-French ROMA218. To the Sarkozy government, all ROMA were 
targets. No matter if they were French ROMA involved in the disturbances at Saint-Aignan and 
Grenoble, or from Bulgaria and Romania with problems relating to alleged visa irregularities, all 
ROMA were targets for deportation219. In order to enact national action against unauthorized 
ROMA camps, the Ministry of the Interior distributed a circular calling for the closing of 
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11310560  
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219 Ibid 2  
“The French government says it plans to shut down 300 illegal Roma camps in the next three months. The 
controversial plan was put in place after clashes last month between police and travellers in the southern 
city of Grenoble and the central town of Saint-Aignan. The Roma were not involved in all of the trouble, 
but the government said travellers' camps were sources of "illegal trafficking" and "exploitation of 
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unauthorized immigrant camps and the deportation of those in violation of French law, work and 
residence visa requirements220. This circular, an official French government document, 
represents the center of controversy regarding the repatriation policy of 2010 as it, aligned with 
previous uncontroversial French policies of deporting illegal persons within French borders, 
stressed the importance of targeting ROMA camps and persons221. 
3.3.2 Second subsection: Analysis of the French ROMA Repatriation Policy 
Despite French government claims that all illegal camps and unauthorized persons were being 
treated equally, a leaked government circular, dated 5 August 2010, states otherwise222. This 
memo, originating from the Ministry of the Interior and later circulated to all French police 
chiefs (“Monsieur le Préfet de police, Monsieur le Directeur general de la police nationale, 
Monsieur le Directeur general de la gendarmerie nationale, Mesdames et Messieurs les Préféts – 
pour action”223), presents an ulterior motive in addition to the government’s desire to remove all 
unauthorized persons from France equally, “[the] leaked memo…signed by the chief of staff for 
                                                 
220 Willsher, Kim. The Guardian, “Orders to police on Roma expulsions from France leaked” 13 
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interior minister Brice Hortefeux, reminds French officials of [the] "specific objective" set out by 
Sarkozy”224. 
This objective becomes readily apparent with a face value reading of the circular, 
employing the same standard used to initially analyze Section 2(b) of SB1070. The French 
circular, written to address the evacuation of the illicit, illegal, camps, states: 
“Le Président de la République a fixé des objectifs précis, le 28 juillet dernier, 
pour l’évacuation des campements illicites: 300 campements ou implantations 
illicites devront avoir été évacués d’ici 3 mois, en priorité ceux des Roms”225. 
 
In this statement, the Interior Ministry stresses that the President of the French Republic wants 
the precise objectives discussed on 28 July fixed. The objective: the evacuation of the 300 illicit, 
illegal camps or implantations to be completed within three months226. Though this does not 
suggest a targeting of specific groups, the following clause raises concern, “en priorité ceux des 
Roms,” that, “Roma camps are a priority”227. In the name of justice and maintenance of security, 
the circular stresses the importance of the President’s desire to remove the ROMA, as described 
in his 30 July 2010 speech in Grenoble228. This circular, a telegram of instructions, sets forth 
how to proceed in closing down and deporting those residing in the illegal camps, again stressing 
the priority of removing the ROMA229. In respecting the authority and legal limitations of the 
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228 Ibid 223 p1 
“Dans son discours de Grenoble, le 30 juillet dernier, le Président de la République a demandé de 
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229 Ibid 223 p2 
“Il revient donc, dans chaque département, aux préfets d’engager, sur la base de l’état de situation des 21 
et 23 juillet, une démarche systématique de démantèlement des camps illicits, en priorité ceux de Rom. 
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government, the circular comments on how the police and national guard will help close the 
camps, again particularly those housing ROMA: 
“Ces opérations constituent un engagement fort pris par le gouvernement afin de 
faire respecter l’autorité de l’Etat. Elles requièrent dès à présent une mobilisation 
personnelle complète de votre part et de tous les services, en priorité à l’encontre 
des campements illicites des roms. La démarche opérationnelle comprend 
notamment…l’engagement systématique, et sans délai pour les sites non 
présentement expulsables, de procédures judiciaires et de vérifications fiscales et 
sociales”230. 
 
Urging that it is, “down to the préfect [state representative] in each department to begin a 
systematic dismantling of the illegal camps, particularly those of the Roma,”231 this circular 
retains one purpose: despite the want and attempts to remove many illegal camps and persons 
from France, the top priority is to singularly target the ROMA.  
If the aforementioned statements regarding the importance of removing the ROMA were 
not clear, the circular continues with four pages of tables regarding illegal persons in France – 
two pages dedicated to the state of illegal ROMA camps, the other two, the camps of all other 
illegal immigrants within France232. This document represents the main insight into the Sarkozy 
government’s position regarding the repatriation of the ROMA. It demonstrates that the main 
goal, via the defense of national security and public health and safety, is to remove all illegal 
persons, particularly the ROMA, from France by any means necessary – expulsion through 
judicial, fiscal or social means. 
Prior to the leaking of this governmental document, despite some concerns regarding the 
nature of the deportations, the EU and other major international actors failed to raise concern 
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regarding the French repatriation policy. In fact, the Sarkozy government even claimed to, “not 
target… Roma camps for destruction and deportations”233. Additionally, days before the leaking 
of the Interior Ministry’s circular, the immigration minister, Eric Besson, said that, “sending 
police to destroy camps and settlements set up by travellers from Romania and Bulgaria and 
ordering inhabitants to leave France was not aimed at the Roma”234. Minister Besson insisted his 
understanding of the government’s policy as, “[that the ROMA] were being treated no differently 
to other European Union migrants who do not meet France's residency rules”235. In fact, the 
minister said, “France has not taken any measure specifically against the Roma [who] are not 
considered as such but as natives of the country whose nationality they have”236. To specify this 
statement, the Minister continued that France will, “maintain our policy of expelling illegal 
immigrants. This is not something new”237. Thus, to ensure the ROMA were not being 
specifically targeted, of the 5,000 Romanians and Bulgarians expelled by August in 2010, only 
1,000 were ROMA238.  Additionally, of the estimated 28,000 persons deported by France in 
2010, the ROMA from Romania and Bulgaria alone, expelled during the month of August, 
accounted for roughly four percent of the year’s total repatriation239. This represents a significant 
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portion, as Romanian and Bulgarian ROMA make up only a fraction of the total of ROMA 
persons residing in and being deported by France. With the total number of Romanian and 
Bulgarian ROMA repatriated for one month being higher than four percent of 2010’s total 
repatriated persons, the French government was specifically targeting this group of ROMA. 
Regardless of whether or not they were disproportionately targeted and discriminated against, 
these ROMA were targeted due to their ethnicity in addition to their legal status within France. 
Despite the treatment towards the ROMA, the French immigration minister expressed the 
French government’s main intent of the repatriation policy. By admitting to an increase in 
deportations since August being in response to, “[the President’s] demand to go ahead with the 
dismantling of all illegal camps,” the minister established France’s understanding of Community 
law and support for repatriation in that, “[the] free movement in the European area doesn't mean 
free settlement. What has been forgotten is that each of the European countries is responsible for 
its own national citizens”240. 
Regardless of whether the ROMA are being treated no differently in the process of 
repatriation than other EU citizens – as all deported adults are given 300 euro incentives and 
transportation to their natural member-state country –the issue remains that ROMA are explicitly 
targeted prior to the process of repatriation, as expressed by the government circular. 
Almost immediately upon the circular’s release, calls against the French policy arose. As 
soon as the circular was released, the Group for Information and Support for Immigrants (Gisti) 
stated it would examine the memo to establish if it broke any criminal laws241. In fact, Stephane 
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Maugendre, president of Gisti, stressed the law’s targeting of an ethnic minority, “Can you 
imagine a circular specifically naming Jews or Arabs?”242 Additionally, the then main opposition 
political party, le PS, the French Socialist party, also questioned the legality of the governmental 
circular and policy, claiming it represented a “xenophobic policy”243. In fact, Harlem Désir, a 
French Socialist MEP, demanded, "the European commission and its president José Manuel 
Barroso to initiate infringement proceedings against the French government to end the indignity 
and stigma unacceptable to the European citizens [the ROMA]”244. 
Despite the numerous accusations and demands for EU action and inquiry into the 
controversy, the French government continued to claim it expelled people on legal and not ethnic 
grounds245. The government’s focus and continued interest in the illegal ROMA camps and 
persons might be caused by the fact that ROMA account for an overwhelming majority of 
foreign persons erecting residence-camps in France, and that, “most Roma from the two 
countries [Bulgaria and Romania] are thought to be in France illegally”246. In fact, despite the 
direct written connection between the President and the ROMA expulsion policy in the leaked 
circular, President Sarkozy claimed his government was unaware of the Interior Ministry’s 
directive, and that the government, upon becoming aware of its existence via press reports, 
prohibited the circular’s ROMA directive247. Additionally, the French government stated that the 
                                                 
242 Ibid 237 
243 Ibid 237 
244 Ibid 237 
245 Hugues, Bastien. “Roms: à Bruxelles, Sarkozy maintient le cap” 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2010/09/16/01002-20100916ARTFIG00611-roms-a-bruxelles-sarkozy-
maintient-son-cap.php  
246 Ibid 127 
247 Ibid 245 
“Pour étayer son propos, le chef de l'Etat a précisé qu'au total, 500 campements illicites ont été 
démantelés au mois d'août, tous après des décisions de justice». A 80%, les personnes concernées étaient 
des gens du voyage, pour la plupart d'origine française. «Ces chiffres démontrent qu'il n'y a eu aucune 
 73 
ROMA repatriated during the August deportations overstayed their three-month residency limit, 
as granted by the EU, without meeting the requirements to legally remain248. 
Even after the EU’s attempts to deter France from continuing ROMA deportations, the 
French government maintained its repatriation policy despite mounting criticism from the EU, 
UN and other international actors. “The[ deportations] were condemned by numerous human 
rights groups, Pope Benedict XVI, and…the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination asked France "to avoid" collective deportations of Roma”249. In response 
to the continued deportations, the political components of the EU took action. Even after a 9 
September 2010 vote by the European Parliament, which passed a resolution by 337 votes to 245 
demanding France to, “immediately suspend all expulsions of Roma”, claiming the policy 
“amounted to discrimination,” the French government maintained its deportation policy, 
circumventing Europe’s central authority250. Though the MEPs’ demands were not legally 
binding, the Parliament’s action nevertheless showed the mass expulsions are prohibited and 
unwarranted under EU law, “since they amount to discrimination on the basis of race and 
ethnicity”251. In addition to the demands given by the European Parliament, German MEP 
Martin Schulz, leader of the social group in the European parliament, said: “The country that 
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gave us liberté, égalité and fraternité has taken a different, regrettable path today”252. Despite the 
controversy’s backlash, the French government remains defiant in the face of international 
condemnation and the EU’s central authority. 
Furthering the EU’s discontent over the continued French policy, the EU’s lead justice 
official, Viviane Reding, rebuked the French government and declared the deportation policy 
illegal. Ms. Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship, declared she was, “appalled by a situation which gave the impression that people are 
being removed from a member state of the European Union just because they belong to a certain 
ethnic minority”253. Prior to the leaking of the Interior Ministry’s circular, two French 
government ministers informed the Commission that the deportation policy in no manner 
targeted specific groups of persons; however, upon the discovery of the 5 August circular, 
Commissioner Reding chided Paris, stating, “This is a situation [the targeting of an ethnic 
minority] I…thought Europe would not…witness again after the Second World War”254. The 
Commissioner went one-step further, warning the French government of the Commission’s 
eventual infringement proceedings, “I am personally convinced that the commission will have no 
choice but to initiate infringement proceedings against France”255. 
The legal authority of the EU to oversee the implementation of its legislation and the 
Treaties, as discerned in the previous section, does not reside with the European Parliament but 
with the Commission. The Commission, as, “charged with upholding European law,” retains the 
power as EU’s executive to oversee member-states’ governments and policies that conflict with 
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Community law256. This oversight capacity, granted by the Lisbon Treaty due to the EU’s 
supremacy power, allows the Commission to take action in cases regarding violations of 
Community law or areas of legislative powers enumerated to the EU. This precedent, established 
by administrazonie delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal S.P.A. and Marleasing SA v La 
Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA, forbids national governments from introducing 
legislation or national provisions that conflict with the Treaties or Community law257. 
In cases of member-states not fulfilling their obligation to abide by Community law and 
legislative acts, the Commission can bring grievances against a member-state before the Court of 
Justice of the EU258. Also, if the Commission believes a member-state violates a directive 
adopted under proper legislative procedure, in this case France violating the 2004 Directive of 
the Freedom of Movement of EU Citizens, it may enact a mandatory monetary fine upon the 
member-state259. Through this capacity, the Commission discovered France’s immigration 
initiative in the wrong on two accounts: firstly, it “was breaking a 2004 law enshrining freedom 
of movement across the EU” as ROMA, from Romania and Bulgaria, are EU citizens; and 
secondly, that, “the EU's charter of fundamental rights outlaws discrimination on ethnic 
grounds”260. 
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The Commission, on 29 September 2010, announced its understanding of recent events. 
After analyzing evidence presented by Commissioners and government officials regarding the 
French policy, the Commission ruled that citizenship, and all rights granted, are guaranteed to all 
citizens of member-states and that these rights must be enforced by all governments, with the 
exception of the security of the nation and safety of public health and order261. Furthermore, the 
Commission stated that:  
“Recent developments in France have led to a detailed exchange between the 
Commission and the French authorities on the application of EU law on free 
movement of people. The Commission took note today of the assurances given by 
France at the highest political level on 22 September 2010 that 
• Measures taken by the French authorities since this summer did not have the 
objective or the effect of targeting a specific ethnic minority, but treated all EU 
citizens in the same manner; 
• The administrative instruction ("circulaire") of 5 August 2010 that was not in 
conformity with this orientation was annulled and replaced by a different 
instruction on 13 September 2010; 
• The French authorities fully ensure an effective and non-discriminatory 
application of EU law in line with the Treaties and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
The Commission noted equally that France reaffirms its commitment to a close 
and loyal cooperation on these matters. The Commission will pursue the exchange 
with the French authorities and is sending a letter to the French authorities with 
detailed questions regarding the practical application of the political assurances 
provided”262. 
 
The Commission ruled that France, despite its attempt to rectify the situation by removing the 
clause, “specifically the ROMA,” from its circular directive, still had not completely integrated 
the substantive safeguards of the 2004 Directive263. Thus, instead of taking legal action against 
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France, whose Minister of the Interior claimed had no knowledge of the August circular and 
ensured it was, “annulled and replaced by an instruction of September 13, 2010, that did not 
target any specific groups,”264 the deportation of persons, including ROMA, was allowed to 
continue. 
As previously stated, the Commission retains the ability to oversee and enforce 
Community law and the Treaties through legal means if the member-state is discovered to have 
enacted legislation in violation of Community law. The August circular clearly demonstrated that 
France was specifically targeting the ethnic minority ROMA; in fact, the circular represented 
written confirmation of the President’s verbal attacks and wish to remove the ROMA population. 
Because of the special conditions upon the freedom of movement of persons form Romania and 
Bulgaria, which remain in effect until 1 January 2014 in France, the ability to deport persons 
who fail to find employment, or those who cannot disprove they will become unreasonable 
burdens upon the state, is not in contradiction of EU law. Furthermore, France’s ability to deport 
persons in order to ensure the security and continued public health and order of the nation, as 
outlined by the 2004 Directive and used by Sarkozy as reasoning for the deportation policy on 30 
July at Grenoble, is also legal by EU law265. 
The targeting of the ROMA as an ethnic minority, however, as described by the August 
circular, violates the founding principles of the Treaty on the EU, the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                             
stage, the Commission considers that France has not yet transposed the Directive on Free Movement into 
national legislation that makes these rights fully effective and transparent. Therefore, the Commission 
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public policy, public security or public health.” 
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Rights and the 2004 Directive. As described in the Directive, “member-states [must] implement 
the Directive without discrimination between beneficiaries of the Directive on grounds 
of…ethnic or social origin…membership of ethnic minority”266. This declaration only supports a 
founding tenant of the Treaty on the EU, that, “the Union is founded on values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of person belonging to minorities”267. Thus, no matter if the French 
government removed the clause dictating French police to specifically target ROMA, the 
circular’s intent remains a fact and a violation of EU law. The Commission, as granted by the 
Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s supremacy clause, possesses the ability to, and should, impose 
economic sanctions upon the French government for failing to completely implement the 2004 
Directive, a fact the Commission admitted to in its 29 September 2010 assessment. 
However, France’s inability to implement or recognized the 2004 Directive towards 
ROMA fails to represent the sole EU member-state to do so. In Germany, since the 1990s, 
ROMA have been denied asylum or some who were granted asylum were returned to their 
country of origin, despite potential dangerous situations awaiting them268. Of the estimated 
170,000-300,000 ROMA in Germany, under 12,000 are believed to be from Romania269. 
However, similarly to the French episode, the ROMA, also from Romania, are being targeted as 
an ethnic minority:  
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“The criminalization of Roma and Sinti by the state and federal authorities 
continues despite denials. The pressure on the community is designed to make 
them move on and in so doing they lose rights to welfare, health care, education 
and housing. Roma/Gypsies usually do not have citizenship. Many long-term 
resident Roma in Germany only have temporary 'tolerated' status, or duldung, 
which provides a stop on expulsion and must be frequently renewed. It often 
includes restrictions on freedom of movement, access to employment and social 
assistance, depending on the particular state (Land).”270 
 
Unlike France or Italy, Germany does not possess a large ROMA population. However, upon the 
arrival of about, “50 Roma from Romania,” who arrived near Kreuzberg’s Görlitzer Park in 
2009, German police quickly “disperse[d] them; [the ROMA] were hunted from site to site until 
finally the families were flown back to Romania”271. Similarly, “In Italy, on the outskirts of 
Rome, Roma camps were cleared out by the police last year”272. The inclusion of ROMA, 
especially from Romania and Bulgaria over the recent six years, is testing the EU’s alleged 
principles of tolerance and multiculturalism. Though the ROMA do not represent the sole group 
of national or group deportations or repatriations, they are a directly targeted group by western 
EU member-states such as Germany, Italy and France. 
The need to prevent further discrimination is paramount as the French deportation of 
persons, including ROMA, continued past the three-month period provided by the initial Sarkozy 
program. No matter if overwhelming public support persists for the deportation policy, in that 
65% of French people initially supported the 2010 initiative, the people’s approval of an illegal 
policy fails to grant the discriminatory act legitimacy273. Also, if the EU wishes to be recognized 
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as a promoter of human rights and fundamental freedoms, it must enact more extensive action 
than drafting a letter of complaint to France. 
The legal precedent and political ability for the Commission to bring a case against 
France to the Court of Justice exists within the EU’s framework, yet no legal action occurs. The 
French law continues, now currently under the presidency of the Socialist party274. Similar to the 
previous conservative government, President Hollande, who, “promised in his election campaign 
that while the dismantlement of illegal encampments would continue, satisfactory ‘alternative 
arrangement would be offered,’” has yet to deliver substantial alternative arrangements and cease 
the deportation of EU citizens275. Though governed by a different political party, France uses the 
same defense for raiding unauthorized immigrant camps and deporting EU citizens, “Paris 
insisted there was no racist motivation in closing the camps, adding that the evicted Roma had 
overstayed the time they were legally allowed to stay in France”276. The continued deportation of 
EU citizens may act in complete abidance of EU law, but ROMA remain a targeted group of 
persons.  
No matter if the specific declaration discriminating against the ROMA is no longer an 
active and expressed component of the French deportation initiative, the August circular remains 
a violation of Community law that must be reprimanded. Without taking legal action to prove the 
illegality and invalid nature of the discriminatory policy, the EU gives the French policy greater 
legitimacy. By failing to take action, the EU is allowing France to continue deporting persons 
without greater, and needed, oversight and EU sanctions to ensure the protection of the rights 
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and freedoms of all EU citizens. The EU’s Commission needs to treat this situation more 
seriously and better defend the human and EU political rights of Romanian and Bulgarian 
ROMA. 
3.3.3 Third subsection: Why Specifically target the ROMA? 
Similar to the US case study, France, in 2010, was nearing a national election. Many believe that 
President Sarkozy initiated his stringent deportation policy, with a strong emphasis on the 
ROMA, in order to win over the far-right vote277. Despite the initial significant popular support, 
65%, for the initiative, a significant reason for why the ROMA were specifically targeted is 
because of their economic weakness and cultural identity clash with the French cultural 
identity278. 
France, unlike other nation-states, interprets citizenship and national identity along 
political lines. The national identity’s origin, attributable to its political revolution of 1789, 
clarifies French citizenship and identity as jus soli, that in order to reside within France and be 
French one must adopt and implement the nation’s societal, cultural and political ideologies, as, 
“France’s citizenship model is culturally monist, requiring foreigners to adapt”279. Only by 
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embracing the French identity will persons be accepted into the nation and regarded as French280. 
From its revolution origin, French citizenship became more than a legal designation but a form 
of identity, a manner of life incorporated with the concept of political allegiance, personal and 
societal integration within the state281. Due to its political, cultural and ethno-centric foundation, 
the concept of citizenship and national identity allowed the French identity to be inclusive and 
assimilationist in nature. 
Because of the manner of the French identity’s formation and recognition of common 
cultural and ethnic similarities, the understanding of outsiders, unwanted persons who did not 
embrace the French identity, arose. The created concept of outsiders, others, led to the fear of 
foreigners, xenophobia, which altered the focus of animosity between rulers of French territories 
towards those who were not ‘French’282. France, in order to establish who was ‘French’, 
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embraced a jus soli society and forced persons who wished to remain within the state to embrace 
French culture, political and social ideologies. France, being a more global power, developed its 
more inclusive attitude towards identity in order to more readily and easily convert and introduce 
new, conquered peoples into a more manageable, universal, French collective283. 
With the rise of France’s global influence came the increase of persons and skilled 
labourers moving within the French empire and settling in France. This rise in foreigners, though 
culturally and politically French, led to a national debate in the 1880’s over whether or not to 
maintain a jus soli national identity, or adopt a jus sanguinis form of identity284. France, with the 
radical reform of 1889, instituted a policy that adopted a more jus sanguinis influenced identity 
form285. Because of this, “a person born in France of a foreign father would no longer have the 
right to claim French citizenship at majority,” thus instead of being considered French at birth, 
French-born offspring of foreign persons would have to, “apply for naturalization like any other 
foreigner, although… would be permitted to do so after satisfying a less stringent residence 
requirement than ordinary foreigners”286. Though having altered immigration standards and the 
sense of national identity, France, because of an increase in the immigrant population, re-
evaluated how to address those entering the nation. In order to maintain a form of social 
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cohesion and diminish xenophobic acts, the French governments attempted to assimilate 
foreigners into their own identity, making them become French after proving their loyalty to the 
French identity. However, despite the continued rise in immigration from across the world, the 
French natives still favoured immigrants originating from French colonies, persons educated as, 
and who were culturally, French287. 
Similar to the US, immigration became a prominent and controversial political issue. Due 
to a growing presence of North African and Middle Eastern migrants in France, per the guest-
worker program initiated in response to the Second World War, the French government enacted 
stringent immigration policies and ceased its guest-worker program in an attempt to stop the 
influx of immigrants during the 1960’s and 1970’s288. The French governments attempted to 
appease the national electorate, as a continued rise of foreign employment occurred in 
conjunction with a high level of natural citizen unemployment289. In fact, in 1974, the French 
government suspended labour migration and the permanent settlement plan offered during the 
guest-worker program initiative290. This plan, however, failed due to France’s being a signing 
member-state and developer of the EEC (later the EC, then EU) as well as the Convention 
Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms291. Because France legally bound itself to 
European, or Community, law in addition to the Convention that established fundamental human 
rights for all persons within EEC member-state borders, the Council of State ruled that family 
reunification of migrants was a basic human right, finding that France, “contravened the 
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constitutional right to family life,” forcing France to open its borders again292. Thus, France 
already dealt with controversial immigration policies in its recent history that conflicted with 
European initiatives and treaties. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, however, France was overruled 
in its limited interpretation of immigration and human rights. Unfortunately for the ROMA, 
France has not yet received as much centralized political and legal attention. 
The French, from the 1950’s through 1980’s, perceived immigrants of non-French 
colonial or European ancestry as ‘bad’ immigrants, persons who should be expelled or not 
allowed to enter293. This perception of foreign, non-French immigrants could explain the popular 
support of deporting the ROMA. From the debate over national identity and national economy, 
the issue of immigration and nationality arose within the political agenda294. 
A potential reason for the Sarkozy government’s decision to enact such a strict 
immigration policy could be that it reacted to the rise of French nationalist politics. The use of 
cultural issues by political parties in France, particularly the National Front Party (FN), altered 
French politics and forced immigration and national security to become forefront issues. Though 
the political potential of immigration has not increased over the past several decades, as 
demonstrated by an analysis of the French electorate, “Martin (2000:256)… the share of [French] 
citizens who believe there are too many immigrant[s]… in France did not rise… between 1966 
and 1993… [as they were] already a majority,” the FN still managed to manipulate the issue into 
becoming a paramount electoral issue295. 
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Due to the legitimization of the FN and the issue of immigration, the Sarkozy-led UMP 
government altered their political stance on immigration296. In order to counteract the rise of the 
FN, the UMP adopted a similar anti-immigration, culturally protectionist and exclusionist 
policy297. It is possible that the deportation policy enacted by Sarkozy in 2010 was a result of the 
UMP’s altered political stances, in an attempt to regain a majority of the electorate’s support. 
Though the government targeted non-authorized persons and EU citizens who failed to find 
employment in France after three months, the issue of culture and identity remain important, 
especially given the specific targeting of the ROMA. As expressed by the Sarkozy government, 
the ROMA were a threat to the security and public health of France. Because ROMA culture 
conflicts with French culture, and the fact that ROMA refuse to assimilate or accept French 
culture and identity, could represent another reason as to their being singled out by Sarkozy’s 
government, in addition to their not finding employment. 
The ROMA, an estranged element of the greater European populace, experience a rather 
primitive livelihood. Because of their cultural values and reluctance to fully include themselves 
within modern European state society, ROMA: 
“Have a lower life expectancy (10 to 15 years lower than the European average), 
have a higher infant mortality rate, live in substandard conditions (described as 
“de facto ghettoes” even in Western European states), face unemployment of up 
to 80 percent, and, in many instances, do not have access to healthcare or 
education”298. 
 
The ROMA, who en masse possess limited education, usually require state support in 
order to survive, due to their poor living and employment conditions. In fact, in order to best 
illustrate their level of unemployment and the high likelihood of their being a burden on a state’s 
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welfare system, “in 2006, 90 percent of all Roma in Bulgaria lived on state benefits”299. The 
perceived poor living conditions and economic shortcomings of the ROMA have led to many 
non-ROMA Europeans to view ROMA as an economic burden upon their state systems, and that, 
“being a Roma [is] a disadvantage: 77 percent of Europeans consider being Roma a 
disadvantage,” which stands in similar position to, “79 percent [of Europeans who] consider 
being disabled a disadvantage”300. Additionally, there are studies that show, “high rates of 
tuberculosis, hepatitis A and B, asthma,” amongst ROMA, as well as high rates of HIV and 
substance abuse301. These instances of poor health and higher rates of disease and substance 
abuse only add to the negative stigma towards the ROMA by Europeans. Furthermore, of the 
ROMA currently living in Europe, “eight out of ten Roma are at risk of poverty; only one out of 
seven young Roma adults have completed upper-secondary education”302. This, in conjunction 
with, “Forced evictions of Roma [being] the norm rather than the exception in…Romania, Italy, 
and France,” and, “education [being] segregated in the Czech Republic, Greece and Slovakia,” 
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“The treatment of Roma, Gypsies and Travellers "has become one of the most pressing political, social 
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demonstrates the seriousness regarding ROMA’s current social, economic and political 
disadvantages303. 
Many of the current ROMA hardships and perceived disadvantages are in reaction to 
“Gypsy law,” ROMA culture and identity that prevents them from completely engaging and 
assimilating into other cultural and national identities304. Because of a lack of common language, 
religion, sense of identity in addition to the fact that the, “Roma are scattered throughout 
Europe–usually in hundreds of small, isolated, ghetto-like communities adjacent to villages and 
cities,” the ROMA’s diversity establishes a loose continuum of related subgroups that, with their 
common law, distance themselves from European cultures and values305. 
Despite the differences between the ROMA communities, they all possess a unifying 
factor in that, “they operate under a similar normative code…[that] operates outside the 
parameters of state law’”306. Though each group retains a different variation, common elements 
and similar moral codes maintain a form of Gypsy law is shared amongst all ROMA307. “The 
Gypsy legal system not only protects the Gypsy from external and internal threats, but also 
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conceivable, even though different groups mostly have similar moral codes.” Because Roma legal 
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 89 
serves as a code that organizes Gypsy society”308. Thus the Gypsy law evolved as a potential 
defense mechanism, “evolved to insulate Gypsies from the host society”309. From this defense 
mechanism against cultural and identity integration arises a, “deep mistrust toward gaje (… all 
non-Roma) [and] ‘disdain for the non-Gypsy world,’ [a perceived Gypsy] cultural superiority, 
and [a Gypsy] entitlement to treat gaje as lesser people”310311. This is the case especially as, 
“Gypsy law is self-contained and cannot incorporate rules of a foreign legal system. The gaje 
legal system is equally insular so far as Gypsy law is concerned”312. 
Interestingly, the French and ROMA share a common distrust of others, outsiders who do 
not embrace or share their culture. Both groups perceive their established identity as proper, and 
compatibility with other cultures remains difficult. In fact, because ROMA believe that, “their 
own law is the only true law,” they often, “do not comply with the laws of the host country and 
often violate the host country’s theft and fraud laws,” as theft and fraud are not considered 
crimes if committed against gaje313. This is the case because, “The Gypsy believe they should 
approach and respond to the gaje with caution” as they are not to be trusted with their modern 
values and civic codes314. Due to the ROMA’s perception of their law’s superiority, it is difficult 
for them to integrate themselves into the host country’s legal framework, national identity and 
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culture. As the French also regard their national identity and citizenship highly, the ROMA could 
represent a disliked group as their cultural identity conflicts with and refuses to assimilate into 
the French culture despite the ROMA’s continued presence within the identity-driven host 
country. This clash of cultures could represent an explanation of the discriminatory policy’s 
origin as well as the French populace’s approval for deporting the ROMA315. No matter the 
rationale or reasoning behind the formulation of the 5 August 2010 circular initiative, the French 
government violated EU law by targeting an ethnic minority and should be held accountable. 
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4.0  THIRD CHAPTER – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONTROVERSIAL 
POLICIES 
4.1 FIRST SECTION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Despite the differences between the two political and geographic systems, both case studies and 
their centralized political entities demonstrate that immigration policy remains a highly 
contentious and controversial issue. Though the American model is situated within an entirely 
federal political and judicial model whilst the European case operates within a more 
intergovernmental, confederate political model, both systems face member-states circumventing 
central authority by violating constitutional jurisdiction or tenants of Community law by dealing 
with immigration. 
Systems of checks and balances exist in both systems in order to counteract such 
violations of central authority. In the US, the first article of the Constitution establishes the 
federal government’s supremacy. In the EU, judicial precedent and an added protocol to the 
Treaty of Lisbon establishes the EU’s supremacy and jurisdiction over centralized European 
affairs, in addition to its ability to oversee and preempt member-state law that conflicts with 
Community law. Though this shared supreme power should deter or make specific member-state 
action illegal, the political systems’ differences may establish why the EU is less capable of 
implementing its supremacy and adequately addressing its immigration controversy. 
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The supremacy and federal government’s ability, in the US, to preempt member-state 
laws, through executive and judicial means, far exceeds the strength and capacity of the EU. As 
granted by the Constitution, the US’ executive branch, with its extensive bureaucracy, retains the 
power and ability to implement and oversee the execution of federal laws and rulings, including 
legislation passed by Congress and Constitutional rulings by SCOTUS – the power of Judicial 
Review, a non-Constitutional power that SCOTUS granted itself in Marbury v Madison 
[1803]316317. With roughly four millions persons comprising numerous departments that 
specialize in specific policy areas, the US federal government’s executive branch’s bureaucracy 
possesses the economic and man power resources to ensure the upholding of the Constitution and 
federal laws318. 
In contrast to the US, the EU’s lack of complete centralized authority and jurisdiction, 
despite the Commission’s role as the EU’s executive branch, demonstrates the centralized body’s 
diminished capacity to enforce Community law. The Commission, similar to the US’ executive 
branch, possesses the power and influence over the member-state governments and their policies 
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because it, “is charged with upholding European law”319. This ability is granted by the Lisbon 
Treaty, which allows the Commission to, “ensure application of Treaties and measures adopted 
by the institutions pursuant to them,” as well as, “oversee the application of Union law under the 
control of the Court of Justice of the European Union”320. These powers, similar to those of the 
US’ federal executive branch, give the Commission the ability to enforce and regulate the 
treaties and all legislation or agreements recognized as carrying legal authority – such as the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Schengen acquis and 2004 Directive. Furthermore, 
though the Commission retains the ability to, “take initiatives to ensure the coordination of 
member-states’ social policies,” such as the member-states’ treatment of ethnic minorities and 
immigration policies, this oversight capacity is far more limited than the American 
counterpart321. Without the needed manpower, economic means and judicial authority, as granted 
by SCOTUS’ judicial review, the Commission and Court of Justice of the EU cannot adequately 
hold member-states accountable for violations of Community law. This inability is exemplified 
by the EU’s greatest punitive measure to deter member-states from violating Community law 
and the Treaties: the Commission’s ability to bring legal action against a member-state to the 
Court of Justice of the EU, during which, if the member-state is found guilty, the Commission 
and also the Court of Justice may enact only a monetary fine322. 
                                                 
319 Ibid 3 
320 Ibid 171 p19 
Article 9D – The Commission 
321 Ibid 171 p48 
Article 2D 
322 Ibid 171 p108 
“When the Commission brings a case before the Court pursuant to Article 226 on the grounds that the 
Member State concerned has failed to fulfill its obligation to notify measures transposing a directive 
adopted under a legislative procedure, it may, when it deems appropriate, specify the amount of the lump 
sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances.” 
 94 
Without greater legal authority over the remaining sovereign policy areas of member-
states, the EU will not be able to completely enforce or ensure the application of Community law 
and the Treaties. Because of this weak ability to defend Community law, France, for example, 
was able to specifically target an ethnic minority without facing staunch judicial penalties. 
The EU, through its established legal authorities, retains some form of power and 
reprimanding abilities to deter current member-states from violating its central authority. Unlike 
the US’ federal government and Department of Justice, the EU’s Commission fails to treat the 
situation regarding the ROMA seriously enough. Though most of France’s actions towards 
deporting ROMA remained legal within the Community Law’s framework, which in itself seems 
contradictory against the EU’s expression of heralding human rights, France did violate ROMA 
human and EU political rights upon targeting them specifically as an ethnic minority. In the US, 
the federal government engaged in legal action to federally preempt the controversial, and later 
discovered mostly unconstitutional, immigration policy. The Commission, however, allowed 
France to remove the controversial language and maintain its deportation of ROMA without 
expressing its targeting of the ethnic minority. Without a substantial political voice or electoral 
representation at the national or European level, the ROMA cannot adequately defend 
themselves against governments similar to France taking action against them. As France violated 
EU law and violated the ROMA’s human right of freedom from discrimination, the EU, within 
its already established judicial framework, must enact an economic penalty upon France and 
other EU member-states that also violate the ROMA’s human right of freedom from 
discrimination. 
In order to better understand how the US was able to take legal action against Arizona 
when the EU did not, despite lack of political motivation, the largest difference between the 
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American and European models is the contrast between executive and judicial bodies’ powers. 
Because of their varying structures, the Commission was less readily able to hold France 
accountable as the American federal government held Arizona. Through the courts and the 
powers of the executive and judicial branches in the American system, most of the controversial 
SB1070 state-legislation was preempted due to discovered unconstitutional elements.  
With its extensive executive bureaucracy, the American federal government can ensure 
the implementation of judicial review by enforcing more than economic penalties upon the state 
of Arizona. Regarding France, however, the member-state still retains partial sovereignty and the 
EU does not yet possess complete jurisdiction over all policy matters in Europe. Because of this 
lack of authority, France, despite violating Community law, was less likely to face substantial 
legal punishment than Arizona. Furthermore, because of the EU’s less clearly enumerated 
powers, the Commission had to establish evidence that France violated Community law by 
targeting the ROMA specifically; this process granted France the ability to remove language 
targeting the ROMA in order to ensure its deportation policy abided by Community law. Despite 
evidence indicating France’s intent to target an ethnic minority, France’s deportation policy 
remains in effect due to no legal action taken by the EU. 
No matter the political differences between the two systems, the US and EU both face 
numerous additional actors committing violations of central authority similar to Arizona and 
France. In the US, a myriad of states enacted similar stringent immigration policies to SB1070; 
in fact, Indiana, Utah and Georgia also face federal judicial action, from Democrat and 
Republican appointees, which blocks their stringent legislation323. Other states, such as Alabama, 
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also enacted strict immigration policies. Even with the successful legal action against Arizona, 
the executive branch must enforce SCOTUS’ ruling upon Arizona and similar state legislations 
in order to prevent violations of the equal protection clause. 
In Europe, France does not represent the sole state actor taking action against the ROMA. 
Though France’s aggressive deportation policy attracted the most international attention, 
“Albania, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and the UK” all 
enacted eviction policies that removed ROMA, according to the European Roma Rights Centre 
(ERRC)324. Not limited to deportations or evictions, actions against ROMA varied depending on 
the EU member-state: in Italy, authorities also evict ROMA325; in northern Romania, a town’s 
authorities built a concrete wall separating ROMA from the rest of the town326; in Portugal, “the 
municipality of Vidigueira destroyed the water supply of 67 Roma (including children, pregnant 
women and elderly people)...After an intervention by ERRC, the authorities restored the water 
supply, but the reconnection was not made known to residents and living conditions remain 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Arizona and Utah both recently had key parts of their laws blocked by federal judges. Now, add Georgia 
and Indiana to the list…A federal judge in Georgia blocked the most contentious provisions of the state’s 
new immigration law. The judge ruled that requiring police to check the immigration status of suspects 
who cannot produce identification amounted to “an end-run” around federal law. Another broadly written 
provision making it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant was also blocked.” 
324 UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency. Minority Rights Group International, State of the World's Minorities 
and Indigenous Peoples 2012 - Roma, 28 June 2012, available at: 
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326 Ibid 324 
“In northern Romania, the local authorities of Baia-Mare erected a concrete wall to separate a Roma 
community from the rest of the town. In response to criticisms of institutionalized racism and 
ghettoization, the mayor of the town claimed that the wall was to protect citizens against car crashes.” 
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deplorable”327; in Serbia, police brutally assault ROMA328; in Hungary, ROMA are targeted by, 
“a far-right vigilante paramilitary group – 'For a Better Future'”329; and in the Czech Republic, 
“Forced sterilization of Roma women remains an unresolved issue,” as “Roma women…still 
wait… for adequate redress for irreparable injuries two years after the Czech government under 
Prime Minister Jan Fischer expressed regret for individual sterilizations”330. 
Each nation’s actions are deplorable and represent a violation of the ROMAs’ human 
freedoms and guaranteed rights as EU citizens. Though France’s targeting of ROMA is illegal, 
the state’s policy fails to represent the most offensive or barbaric criminal act against the ethnic 
group in the EU. Sadly, the Commission and other EU agencies have not brought similar, if not 
added, attention to the aforementioned targeting of ROMA as conducted with the French 
deportation policy. Dealing with the ROMA remains an arduous process as ROMA abide by 
mostly, if not only, their customs and laws, failing to address or abide by the customs and laws 
of host member-states. Despite the ROMA’s decision to live outside member-state law and 
potentially endanger the public order, safety and health of the nation, the ethnic group’s actions 
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never grant a government or group of persons the ability to abuse or deny their granted 
protections and human rights. 
With a large number of states, in the US and EU, adopting, or having already adopted, 
controversial immigration policies or strategies addressing immigrants, the issue of state 
sanctioned immigration policies acting contrarily to central authority is not an unusual 
occurrence. Whether or not this represents an attack on centralized authority and an undermining 
of international treaties, organizations and agreed upon fundamental human rights, France’s 
deportation policy and Arizona’s immigration policy contain both wrong and illegal components. 
Additionally, despite the stark contrast in the political systems’ capabilities, the American federal 
and European evolving political system both failed to adequately deal with these issues. The EU, 
by failing to bring legal action against France and allowing xenophobic policies to continue, may 
lose international respectability and internal legitimacy. Both political unions must take greater 
legal and political action against these controversial policies in order to demonstrate their 
illegitimacy as well as illegal and unwarranted elements. 
4.2 SECOND SECTION: POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
In lieu of the comparative analysis, new policies and political powers for the US and EU must be 
suggested to better address the concerning issue of human rights violations and illegal actions 
taken by member-states circumventing central authority. Regarding the US, new policy 
suggestions will strengthen the federal government’s authority and improve living conditions for 
millions of persons residing within the US; regarding the EU, an increase in central authority, 
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executive and judicial power must occur in order to ensure a more successful implementation 
and abidance of Community law and the Treaties by all member-states. 
In the US case study, too many failed attempts at reforming or passing new immigration 
policies caused a rift between the federal government and states. Disturbed by the lack of 
successful action and modernization of policies to counteract evolving immigration problems in 
Congress, states felt the need to address immigration on their own. Resulting from the prolonged 
lack of, “federal comprehensive [immigration] legislation,” complaints surfaced articulating that, 
“the federal government has not satisfactorily stemmed the tide of illegal immigration”331. 
Dealing with immigration individually, states enacted numerous policy standards, “creating an 
uneven patchwork of standards across the country”332. The spectrum of state policies passed 
ranges from legislation to, “ease conditions for undocumented youth through granting access to 
in-state college tuition as well as public and private sources of financial aid,” to stringent laws 
similar to SB1070333. In all circumstances, the federal government’s lack of formulating and 
enacting successful immigration policy created the window of opportunity for Arizona to draft 
SB1070 in order to curtail illegal immigration. 
Thus, the US’ first policy initiative must be to orchestrate a new and effective 
immigration policy.  The format of this policy, however, remains open to debate as some argue 
that, “undocumented immigrants are an economic drain,” while others claim, “they are an 
economic boon”334. This debate is further demonstrated by the contention over undocumented 
workers and whether they claim jobs from natural citizens, or if they, “do work that Americans 
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are unwilling to undertake”335. Sadly, though many experts express legal immigration should be, 
“made more efficient to deter illegal immigration and attract skilled foreign workers,” it is 
believed the debate regarding the enforcement of anti-illegal immigration procedures, “has 
blocked progress on broader reform”336. 
The need to pass immigration reform is great, especially as a majority of Americans 
believe the country’s immigration system, “is urgently in need of reform”337. Additionally, a 
Gallup poll from January 2012 discovered, “two-thirds of Americans are dissatisfied with the 
current level of immigration into the [country], with 42 percent of respondents saying it should 
be decreased”338. Whether the argument is to enact stronger illegal immigration enforcement 
policies or reform legal immigration policies and grant citizenship to the undocumented, 
unauthorized workers and their families who currently reside in the country, there remains 
substantial demand for policy reform from both state governments and the American electorate.  
Interestingly, though much of the debate circulating illegal immigration regards 
immigrants entering from Mexico, recent studies by the Pew Hispanic Center, “show that 
migration flows between Mexico and the United States have been at net zero since 2007, 
primarily due to declining U.S. economic opportunity”339340. This trend, though recent, has not 
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yet arisen within the immigration reform debate. Because of the decrease in immigrant flow prior 
to laws such as SB1070, the need to enforce border security across the Mexican border does not 
appear as prevalent an issue. 
Instead of simply focusing on the need to expel, deport or prevent entry of unwanted 
workers in the US, the federal government must better address the issue of unauthorized workers 
already present in the country. Within the new immigration policy, the federal government 
should decide to recognize the unauthorized workers already present within the US, those who 
have worked and contributed to the economy and nation. Instead of facing deportation, those 
present for years whilst abiding by state law, and who are employed, should be rewarded for 
their dedication and service to the host-state and country by becoming legal members of society. 
Thus, instead of focusing on, “an enforcement-heavy approach,” which only, “instills a culture of 
fear in immigrant communities,” the federal government should support, “comprehensive 
immigration reform that emphasizes streamlining legal pathways to citizenship in addition to 
enforcement policies,” such as an expansion of the DREAM Act341. Though border security must 
be strengthened to prevent human and drug trafficking as well as further massive waves of illegal 
immigrants, undocumented workers as well as children of illegal immigrants already present in 
the US should be treated with respect and rewarded for their service and dedication to their host 
country. Additionally, granting a path to citizenship for these persons would be more cost 
beneficial for the US than deporting hundreds of thousands of persons. 
The EU must address its immigration controversies differently. Instead of just reforming 
immigration policy, the EU, in order to best combat member-states that counter or violate 
                                                                                                                                                             
deportations, the growing dangers associated with illegal border crossings, the long-term decline in 
Mexico’s birth rates and broader economic conditions in Mexico.” 
341 Ibid 331 
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Community law, must improve and strengthen its central authority by garnering greater 
jurisdiction as well as political and judicial authority. With this greater authority, the 
Commission may overcome its political hesitancy of not engaging a member-state regarding 
human rights and EU political rights violations of an ethnic minority much of Europe dislikes. A 
potential solution to better protect the fundamental human rights and liberties of all EU citizens, 
including ROMA, in addition to better holding member-states accountable, is for the EU to look 
towards the US federal model. Despite retaining a supremacy clause and distinct enumerated 
powers that grant the EU the ability to enforce and regulate Community law and the Treaties, the 
EU is currently too weak to adequately uphold and enforce EU legislation whilst successfully 
sanctioning and deterring member-states from violating Community law. 
To improve the EU’s respectability and ability to defend and protect its citizens’ rights, 
the EU should expand the Commission’s executive bureaucracy and powers to resemble those of 
the US’ federal government’s executive branch. Additionally, the EU should grant the Court of 
Justice the power of Judicial Review, enabling it to determine the legality of state’s legislation 
without direct cases from the Commission. Thus, with the power of Judicial Review, the Court of 
Justice could enforce greater punitive measures for Community law and EU legislation violations 
than simple economic fines as well as circumvent the Commission’s lack of interest or political 
will to bring a case against France to the Court of Justice. By also possessing a stronger, larger 
executive, the EU would better ensure the Court of Justice’s rulings be enforced upon the 
member-states. Without a bureaucracy similar to the American federal executive branch, the 
judicial rulings of the Court of Justice would be powerless and illegitimate, requiring member-
states to implement rulings. If the EU had government agencies capable of implementing judicial 
verdicts, in addition to economic penalties, upon member-states who violate centralized 
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authority, Community law would be better protected. From this, the EU would gain legitimacy 
from its ability to enforce and defend its fundamental principles. 
The likelihood of the EU’s political system evolving to a more federal, centralized 
authority remains unlikely. Because member-states remain unwilling to relinquish sovereignty 
over specific issues and policy areas, as well as the want to retain national identities, the 
likelihood of the EU amassing the needed powers to better enforce and regulate its legislation 
and Community law remains minute at best. Though it may take decades to achieve this 
centralization of powers, if the Commission and Court of Justice were to acquire the 
aforementioned powers and responsibilities, the possibility of a member-state circumventing the 
EU’s authority, similar to France’s deportation of ROMA policy, would be considerably 
diminished. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
After conducting legal and comparative political analysis of both case studies, Arizona’s SB1070 
and France’s deportation of ROMA are considered illegal acts conducted by member-states 
circumventing their respective centralized political authority. Though both states’ policies 
violated specific elements of US and EU law, both acted in the name of public health and 
security – common, good intentioned words used to justify their stringent immigration policies 
for the good of the many and the state. Though the EU grants member-states the ability to curtail 
human rights in order to protect the public health, public and national security of the member-
state, neither the EU nor the US allows political actors to target specific minorities or groups of 
persons. Discrimination is strictly prohibited. 
Furthermore, despite Arizona and France acting to preserve public health and security so 
as to protect the rights and safety of the many – by removing unauthorized workers, specifically 
targeting the unwanted ROMA, or trying to prevent human trafficking and crime being brought 
into Arizona from Mexico – their actions risk unleashing significant harm towards the few. In 
both case studies, unauthorized persons were explicitly targeted under the umbrella of good 
intentions initiated by member-states of greater centralized political organizations. Instead of 
simply targeting illegal immigrants, legal residents and citizens also suffered, proving the illegal 
and unjustified components of the respective policies. Regardless of the debate circulating the 
nature of human rights, whether they are universal guarantees or affordable luxuries in relation to 
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the continued security of the state, the fundamental human right guaranteeing protection against 
discrimination must remain absolute and not a diminishable freedom. 
After too many conflicts centered on discrimination and the targeting of groups due to 
ethnic differences, we have and must continue to, through international treaties and national 
laws, ensure and protect the right to exist and remain free from discrimination across all ethnic 
identities. If we cross that line and discriminate against others, once we embrace xenophobia and 
curtail this entitled right, where do we stop? What justification or group’s difference is off limits 
in order to protect the state? 
We as a society and culture cannot use excuses to diminish or destroy certain groups’ 
rights. In the 21st century, after previous calamities in human history when such excuses were 
used, we should all be beyond this. Human rights and fundamental freedoms should not be 
privileges or courtesies granted by the government and political actors, but guarantees 
continuously being enforced and protected. 
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